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Three  Years 

of  the 

Great  War 

Frank  ft  Simonds 


PRICE  25'CBNJS 


(Copyright.  1917.  The  Tribune  Association) 
(Registered  in  accordance  with  the  Copyright 
Act.  Canada.  1917.  The  Tribune  Association] 


THREE  YEARS  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 


Three  Years 


The  Great  War 

A   Comprehensive   Review 
by 

FRANK    H.  SIMONDji 


Associate  Editor  of  the  New 
York  Tribune,  constituting 
the  summaries  written  by  him 
at  the  end  of  July,  1915, 
July,  1916,  and  July,  1917 


Page  One 


THREE  YEARS  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 


Frank    H.  Simonds 

Author  of  "The  Great  War" 
"They    Shall  Not  Past,"  Etc. 


BY     PRANK    H.     S  I  M  O  N  D  S 


Concerning  Simonds 

7T  ITH  the  declining  importance  of  the  war  correspond- 
ent*  ^ue  to  l^e  Jmmens^y  an<^  stricter  censorship  of 
modern  warfare,  has  come  the  rise  of  the  great  war 
editor. 

The  new  center  of  military  information  is  this  master  stu- 
dent who,  versed  in  the  geography  and  topography  of  the  fight- 
ing countries,  and  possessing  an  accurate  estimate  of  the  strength 
of  the  contending  forces  and  a  first-hand  knowledge  of  the  morale 
of  the  men,  traces  the  ebb  and  flow  of  the  lines  on  each  of  the 
fronts;  watches  with  hawk  eyes  the  seeming  minor  events  that  in- 
dicate a  coming  drive  or  retreat;  and,  with  almost  prophetic  pen, 
points  out  what  to  expect  shortly  at  a  given  point. 

The  one  American  editor  ideally  equipped  for  his  great  task 
is  Frank  H.  Simonds.  For  years  before  this  war  Mr.  Simonds 
was  a  reporter  for  metropolitan  newspapers  in  positions  that 
brought  him  into  contact  with  the  biggest  men  in  this  country.  In 
Washington  and  Albany  he  acquired  a  political  insight  that  proved 
invaluable  to  him  when  he  came  to  study  the  present  war  where  so 
many  military  movements  are  undertaken  with  an  eye  to  purely 
political  effect  in  one  country  or  another. 

For  years  before  this  war  Mr.  Simonds  made  the  study  of 
geography  and  military  history  his  hobby.  He  pored  over  all 
available  accounts  of  the  strategic  campaigns  of  the  American 
Civil  War  and  those  European  struggles,  the  Napoleonic  and 
others,  that  were  fought  over  the  same  ground  where  the  front 
line  trenches  now  stand. 

Thus  prepared,  as  an  editorial  writer  on  the  New  York  Even- 
ing Sun,  Mr.  Simonds,  at  the  outbreak  of  the  Great  War,  as- 

Page  Three 


THREE  YEARS  OP  THE  GREAT  WAR 

tonished  the  country  by  his  keen  insight  into  the  course  of  events 
and  his  predictions  that  proved  so  startiingly  true.  He  was  every- 
where quoted.  Magazines  of  national  circulation  reprinted  his 
comments.  He  wrote  two  volumes  on  "The  Great  War"  that 
brought  him  immediate  applause  from  military  critics  for  their  ac- 
curacy and  from  the  man  in  the  street  for  their  simplicity. 

In  March,  1915,  Mr.  Simonds  joined  the  New  York 
Tribune  as  associate  Editor,  taking  complete  charge  of  its  Edi- 
torial Page.  His  work  on  the  Tribune  has  brought  his  increas- 
ing popularity  with  those  who  wish  to  keep  in  touch  with  the 
biggest  thing  in  world  history. 

In  the  spring  of  1916,  Mr.  Simonds  went  to  Europe  and 
was  received  by  General  Petain  during  the  glorious  defence  of 
Verdun.  He  again  visited  the  front  early  in  1917,  spending 
nearly  two  months  in  England  and  with  the  British  armies  in 
France,  being  for  some  time  the  guest  of  General  Sir  Douglas 
Haig.  America's  great  war  critic  is  held  as  highly  abroad  as  in 
his  own  country. 

His  weekly  reviews  of  the  war  have  made  Mr.  Simonds  the 
best-known  expert  in  the  United  States.  Published  in  the  New 
York  Tribune  and  other  leading  papers,  they  have  kept  hun- 
dreds of  thousands  informed  of  the  actual  situation  to  date. 

The  following  reviews  of  three  years  of  the  war  written 
at  the  close  of  each  period  are  typical  examples  of  Mr.  Simonds' 
military  knowledge,  his  foresight  and  his  clear,  fascinating  style. 
His  full-page  weekly  war  articles  illustrated  with  large  maps  will 
continue  to  give  his  readers  an  accurate  understanding  of  the  cur- 
rent developments  and  events  to  be  expected  in  this  struggle  against 
autocracy. 


Page  Four 


BY    FRANK    H.    S  I  M  O  N  D  S 


The  Great  War — First  Year 

HE  purpose  of  this  review  is  to  summarize  briefly  the 
main  military  phases  of  the  first  year  of  the  war.  To 
do  this  it  is  perhaps  simplest  to  accept  the  unity  supplied 
by  the  three  major  campaigns,  those  of  Germany  against 
France,  of  Russia  against  Austria  and,  finally,  of  Germany  against 
Russia,  which  is  still  going  forward.  A  fourth  division  may  be 
found  in  the  attempted  offensives  of  the  Allies  in  the  west,  so  far 
unsuccessful  in  the  larger  view,  at  the  Dardanelles,  and  in  the 
fields  now  invaded  by  Italy,  where  again  the  results  are  as  yet 
without  real  meaning. 

The  effort  will  be  made  here  to  show  what  was  in  the  minds 
of  the  high  command  of  the  armies  making  the  several  bids  for 
decision,  the  extent  of  the  success  or  failure,  and  the  causes,  so 
far  as  they  are  yet  set  forth  in  any  official  or  unofficial  but  trust- 
worthy comment.  Save  for  the  Battle  of  the  Marne,  which  is, 
so  far,  the  one  clearly  decisive  engagement  of  the  whole  war,  little 
attention  will  be  paid  to  individual  engagements. 

I.     Germany  Against  France 

The  first  phase  of  the  world  war  was  comprehended  in  a 
tremendous  effort  of  the  whole  German  military  establishment, 
save  for  perhaps  250,000  troops  sent  to  hold  back  the  first 
Russian  columns  in  the  east,  to  crush  French  military  power,  take 
Paris,  remove  the  French  as  a  factor  in  the  present  war,  achieve 
a  decision  exactly  similar  to  that  won  in  the  Franco-Prussian  War 
and  obtain  it  in  the  same  time.  It  was  of  prime  importance  to 
win  quickly,  because  there  was  a  perfect  realization  in  Berlin  that 

Page  Five 


FIRST    YEAR    OP    THE    GREAT    WAR 

Austria-Hungary  could  not  permanently  deal  with  the  Russian 
armies  single-handed. 

Since  the  French  frontier  from  Luxemburg  to  Switzerland 
was  fortified  strongly,  German  military  chiefs  recognized  that  it 
could  not  be  forced  without  delays  that  might  make  it  possible 
for  Russia  to  dispose  of  Austria  before  France  had  been  put  out. 
Accordingly,  the  invasion  of  France  by  way  of  Belgium  was 
decided  upon,  and  at  least  1,000,000  men  were  sent  in  three 
armies  through  Belgian  territory,  while  three  more  of  about  equal 
strength  were  employed  through  Luxemburg,  Lorraine  and  Alsace. 

In  thinking  of  the  first  campaign  it  is  well  to  remember 
always  that  the  Germans  had  but  two  things  in  mind,  to  destroy 
French  armies  utterly  and  to  do  this  within  the  first  six  weeks 
of  the  war.  The  capture  of  forts,  cities,  the  success  in  incidental 
engagements,  was  of  no  real  meaning  if  the  great  decision  was 
not  to  be  had.  The  German  strategy  aimed  at  annihilation,  ex- 
pected to  achieve  it  and  conducted  the  operation  with  a  disregard 
of  all  expense  of  life  and  equipment  which  was  only  conceivable 
as  the  price  of  a  supreme  success. 

Conversely,  the  sole  problem  of  the  French  in  this  same 
period  was  to  keep  their  armies  in  being,  save  Paris  and  escape 
the  annihilation  planned  by  their  great  foe.  To  meet  the  German 
avalanche  they  had  a  little  more  than  half  as  many  troops,  with 
British  supports,  which  were,  however,  insignificant  in  numbers. 
The  French  were  also  handicapped  by  the  fact  that  their  mobiliza- 
tion was  based  upon  the  assumption  that  Germany  would  come 
through  Alsace-Lorraine  and  not  through  neutral  Belgium,  and 
the  plans  could  not  be  changed  after  mobilization  had  begun. 
Thus  it  was  necessary  for  France  to  execute  a  complete  recon- 
centration  of  her  armies  after  the  campaign  had  opened.  But  it 

Pagr  Mr 


BY    FRANK    H.     S  I  M  O  N  D  S 

is  necessary  to  recall  here  that  the  single  necessity  for  the  French 
was  to  survive  the  first  avalanche.  This  was  Joffre's  problem,  as 
that  of  von  Moltke  was  to  annihilate  the  French.  On  these  terms 
it  is  possible  to  estimate  pretty  exactly  the  results  of  this  first  cam- 
paign, the  greatest  the  world  had  ever  seen  in  numbers,  in  the 
size  of  battlefields  and  in  the  losses  that  were  suffered  by  all 
contestants. 

THE  BELGIAN  PHASE  (Auc.  4-22) 

The  first  shots  on  the  Belgian  frontier  were  fired  on  August 
4.  The  next  day  German  troops  reached  the  forts  of  Liege.  The 
army  was  commanded  by  General  von  Emmich  and  numbered 
about  30,000  picked  troops.  Despite  the  contemporary  impres- 
sion, the  Belgian  resistance,  while  heroic,  was  wholly  ineffective. 
Liege  was  occupied  on  August  7.  For  a  week  the  Belgian  com- 
mander, General  Leman,  held  one  or  two  of  the  forts  west  of 
the  Meuse,  but  these  were  destroyed  by  the  first  shots  of  the 
German  heavy  artillery  on  August  14  or  15. 

In  the  meantime  German  mobilization  was  completed,  con- 
centration took  place  and  on  August  15  the  German  masses  were 
setting  out  on  their  dash  to  Paris.  All  this  time  there  had  been 
steady  skirmishing  between  the  field  forces  of  the  Belgians  and 
the  screen  of  German  cavalry  which  was  preparing  the  way  for 
the  coming  of  the  armies.  These  skirmishes  were  magnified  into 
battles  by  Brussels  reports,  but  were  of  no  real  importance  and 
ended  in  the  complete  demoralization  of  the  Belgian  army. 

Once  the  German  advance  was  begun  it  swept  irresistibly 
forward.  One  force  under  von  Kluck  moved  straight  on  Brus- 
sels ;  a  second,  under  von  Buelow,  crossed  the  Meuse  at  Huy  and 
advanced  upon  Namur  and  a  third  came  through  the  Ardennes 
and  struck  at  the  line  of  the  Meuse  above  Namur.  Brussels  fell 

Page  Seven 


FIRST    YEAR    OF    THE    GREAT    WAR 

on  August  20.  the  Belgian  army  fled  to  Antwerp  and  the  Ger- 
man army,  having  passed  the  capital,  started  south  for  Paris. 
The  Belgian  phase  ended  on  August  22  with  the  abrupt  fall  of 
Namur  and  the  opening  battles  between  the  German  armies  and 
the  Anglo-French  forces  of  the  north. 

FRENCH  DISASTER  (Auc.  4-18) 

While  the  Germans  were  coming  through  Belgium  the 
French  had  attempted  to  invade  Alsace-Lorraine,  had  been  suc- 
cessful at  the  start,  and  then  heavily  beaten  east  of  Metz  and 
driven  in  disorder  into  French  territory  about  Nancy.  A  second 
French  offensive  across  the  Meuse  into  Belgian  Luxemburg  had 
met  with  another  defeat.  At  the  moment  when  the  German 
forces  of  the  north  struck  the  Allied  armies  along  the  Sambre  and 
the  Meuse  from  Mons  to  Givet  the  French  armies  from  Switzer- 
land to  the  Belgian  frontier  were  retreating  in  disorder. 

To  meet  the  German  advance  through  Belgium  the  French 
and  British  took  their  stand  in  the  angle  between  the  Meuse  and 
the  Sambre  rivers.  The  position  was  naturally  strong,  but  was 
based  upon  the  Belgian  fortress  of  Namur.  To  the  utter  amaze- 
ment of  the  world  Namur  fell  within  a  few  hours,  the  British 
about  Mons  were  struck  in  front  and  flank  by  overwhelming 
forces  and  the  French  were  driven  out  of  their  positions  west  and 
south  of  Namur. 

The  opening  battles  of  Mons  and  Charleroi  were  between 
some  300,000  Allied  troops  and  750.000  Germans.  Both  bat- 
tles were  broken  off  before  they  reached  a  decision,  both  were 
Allied  defeats  and  they  opened  the  way  to  the  possible  destruction 
of  the  whole  Allied  forces  in  the  north  at  the  moment  that  the 
French  armies  in  the  east  were  retreating  after  having  been  routed. 

Paae  Eight 


BY    FRANK    H.     S  I  M  O  N  D  S 

THE  GREAT  RETREAT  (Auc.  22-SEPT.  6) 

On  August  22  the  German  armies  were  in  full  pursuit  of 
the  Allies  from  Switzerland  to  the  Sambre.  The  great  problem 
was  now  whether  von  Kluck  could  destroy  the  British  army  on 
the  extreme  left,  interpose  between  Paris  and  the  whole  Allied 
battle  front,  cut  off  the  retreating  armies  and  roll  them  up  in  such 
an  envelopment  as  had  won  the  war  of  1 870.  For  the  Allies 
the  single  effort  was  to  escape  the  net,  get  south  to  a  point  where 
they  could  again  put  a  line  in  front  of  the  Germans. 

All  this  week  the  British  army  occupied  the  danger  point, 
was  almost  enveloped,  escaped  only  by  retreating  day  and  night, 
lost  heavily  in  men  and  equipment,  but  finally  escaped  after  fight- 
ing a  number  of  rear  guard  battles.  The  French  armies,  on  their 
part,  retreated  with  greater  deliberation  and  were  never  in  great 
danger. 

By  September  1  the  French  and  British  were  once  more  in 
line  from  the  Vosges  to  the  walls  of  Paris,  but  all  Northern  France 
was  now  in  German  hands  and  a  victorious  German  army  was 
assailing  Nancy.  It  was  no  longer  possible  for  the  Allies  to  re- 
treat without  abandoning  Paris,  and  the  Germans,  still  on  schedule 
time,  were  within  sight  of  the  outer  forts  of  the  French  capital. 

BATTLE  OF  THE  MARNE  (SEPT.  7-10) 

At  the  opening  of  this  great  battle  the  French  held  a  line 
from  Paris  to  Verdun,  curving  deeply  to  the  south.  On  this 
line  Joffre  had  been  concentrating  his  forces  since  the  opening 
defeats.  Now  the  Germans  were  in  turn  threatened  with  envel- 
opment from  Paris  and  from  Verdun,  and  about  Paris  a  new 
French  army  had  been  collected,  which  energetically  struck  east 
upon  von  Kluck's  flank. 

Page  Nine 


FIRST     YEAR    OF     THE    GREAT     IV  A  R 

But  the  decisive  point  in  the  Battle  of  the  Marne  was  about 
La  Fere  Champenoise,  and  the  first  heavy  blow  was  struck  here 
by  General  Foch.  On  September  9  the  whole  French  line,  after 
two  weeks  of  steady  retreat,  suddenly  struck  back,  defeated  the 
Germans  in  a  number  of  terrific  engagements  and  drove  all  the 
German  armies  from  Lorraine  to  Lagny  back  in  a  complete  defeat 
which  amounted  to  a  rout  at  certain  points.  At  the  moment  when 
Berlin  was  waiting  to  hear  of  the  fall  of  Paris  all  the  German 
armies  were  in  retreat  France  was  not  to  be  overwhelmed.  In  this 
battle  more  than  3,000,000  were  engaged,  the  losses  were  not 
less  than  500,000  and  the  battle  front  was  nearly  two  hundred 
miles  long. 

ON  THE  AISNE  (SEPT.  1 3-OcT.  9) 

In  the  opening  days  of  the  second  week  in  September  there 
was  hope  in  Allied  capitals  that  the  Germans  might  be  driven 
out  of  France,  but  it  proved  vain.  Between  the  Marne  and  the 
Aisne  the  Germans  rallied.  The  fall  of  Maubeuge  freed  a  Ger- 
man army  which  came  south  and  reinforced  von  Kluck.  Allied 
advance  was  stopped  at  this  stream  and  in  the  next  few  days 
the  Germans  established  a  line  from  the  Oise  at  Noyon  to  the 
Argonne.  All  Allied  efforts  to  drive  them  failed. 

The  French  then  made  a  desperate  effort  to  turn  the  Ger- 
mans out  by  attacking  their  right  flank  and  turning  it,  coming  in 
about  St.  Quentin.  But  this  failed,  and  in  a  few  more  days  the 
line  had  begun  to  mount  toward  Belgium,  each  General  Staff 
meeting  the  other's  efforts  with  new  battalions.  Meantime  the 
Germans  directed  their  attention  toward  making  their  position  in 
Belgium  secure  by  besieging  Antwerp,  which  fell  after  a  ten-days' 
siege  on  October  9. 

Pagt  Ten 


BY    FRANK    H.     S  I  M  O  N  D  S 


Just  before  this  surrender  the  British  had  been  taken  out  of 
their  trenches  along  the  Aisne  and  sent  north  to  fill  the  gap  be- 
tween the  French  battle  line  and  the  sea.  Their  objective  was 
Antwerp,  but  the  fall  of  this  town  ruined  their  plans  and  they 
were  again  left  to  face  an  overwhelming  attack  by  new  German 
armies,  supported  only  by  the  beaten  Belgian  army,  which  had 
escaped  from  Antwerp  and  come  south  through  Ostend  to  the 
Yser  River  north  of  Dunkirk. 

BATTLES  OF  FLANDERS  (OcT.  21,  Nov.  15) 

German  effort  to  crush  France  had  failed.  There  remained 
the  chance  of  capturing  the  Channel  ports,  Calais,  Boulogne  and 
Dunkirk;  straightening  the  western  front  and  shortening  it,  pre- 
paring the  way  for  submarine  and  Zeppelin  campaigns  against 
England  and  completing  the  conquest  of  Belgium. 

Accordingly,  vast  new  forces  were  sent  into  the  line  between 
Lille  and  Ostend  and  a  general  German  advance  in  masses  was 
begun  against  the  thin  line  of  British  and  Belgian  troops  on  this 
front.  A  month  of  desperate  fighting  followed.  The  Belgians, 
heavily  attacked,  just  managed  to  cling  to  the  Yser  line,  after 
opening  the  sluices  and  flooding  the  region.  The  British  held 
Ypres  despite  a  50  per  cent,  loss  and  against  three  or  four  times 
their  number.  The  struggle  was  over  by  November  1 5. 

In  sum,  then,  the  first  German  offensive  was  decisively  beaten 
at  the  Marne.  France  was  neither  destroyed  nor  seriously  crippled. 
Her  losses  in  captured  and  killed  and  wounded  combined  probably 
equalled  those  of  the  Germans,  who,  as  the  attacking  force,  lost 
heavily.  Not  less  than  a  million  men  were  put  out  in  this  opening 
phase.  But  at  the  end  the  Germans  had  won  only  a  few  thousand 
square  miles  of  territory  in  France,  they  had  failed  to  take  Paris 

Page  Eleven 


FIRST    Y  h  A  R    OF    THE    GREAT     WAR 

or  the  Channel  ports  and  they  could  no  longer  afford  to  neglect 
the  Russian  menace.  From  November  15  to  July  25  the  western 
campaign  from  the  German  side  has  been  defensive,  save  for  local 
attacks.  It  has  become  a  mere  war  of  trenches. 

II.     Russia  Against  Austria 

Russian  mobilization  being  slower  than  German,  Berlin  had 
calculated  that  it  would  be  at  least  six  weeks  before  Germany 
need  fear  any  attack  upon  the  east,  since  the  Austrian  armies 
might  be  expected  to  hold  back  the  first  advances  of  the  Russians. 
The  Russian  problem  was  to  dispose  of  Austria  before  Germany 
could  get  back  from  her  great  campaign  in  France.  Thus  all 
the  efforts  of  Russian  high  command  were  at  first  directed  against 
Austria.  But  the  opening  successes  of  Germany  in  France  led 
to  the  appeal  for  Russian  intervention  against  Germany,  which 
modified  both  German  and  Russian  plans  and  not  impossibly  con- 
tributed to  the  ultimate  failure  of  both. 

In  examining  the  Russian  operations,  therefore,  it  is  necessary 
to  think  both  of  the  great  movement  against  Austria  and  the 
subsidiary  operations  against  Germany,  first  offensive  and  later 
defensive,  when  Germany  began  to  help  her  stricken  ally. 

In  the  opening  days  of  the  war  the  Austrians  sent  their  main 
forces  to  Galicia  and  attempted  to  invade  Poland  from  Galicia 
with  one  force,  while  holding  the  Galician  front  east  of  Lemberg 
with  another.  Their  operations  were  handicapped  by  the  terrible 
defeat  they  suffered  almost  at  the  outset  of  the  war  at  the  hands 
of  the  Serbians  along  the  Jedar  and  by  the  additional  fact  that 
some  of  the  best  Austrian  troops  and  most  of  their  heavy  artillery 
were  borrowed  by  the  Germans  for  their  operations  in  France 
and  Belgium. 

Tu-rhe 


BY    FRANK    H.     S  I  M  O  N  D  S 


TANNENBERG  (SEPT.  1) 

While  Russian  and  Austrian  mobilization  was  still  incom- 
plete the  Allied  disasters  in  the  west  drove  Paris  and  London 
to  ask  Petrograd  to  invade  East  Prussia  to  compel  Germany  to 
recall  troops  from  France.  Accordingly  two  Russian  armies, 
one  from  Warsaw,  the  other  from  the  Niemen,  were  sent  into 
East  Prussia.  Both  won  initial  successes,  and  the  Niemen  army, 
having  defeated  the  Germans  at  Gurabinnen,  approached  Koenigs- 
berg.  But  the  second,  having  reached  Allenstein,  was  enveloped 
by  Hindenburg  in  the  swamp  districts,  forced  into  the  marshes 
and  practically  annihilated.  More  than  100,000  troops  were 
put  out  in  this  fight,  and  the  second  Russian  army  escaped  only 
by  rapid  retreat. 

The  disaster  of  Tannenberg  took  place  on  September  1.  It 
was  a  defeat  exceeding  in  proportions  any  achievement  of  Napo- 
leon, but  it  unquestionably  contributed  to  the  success  of  the  Allies 
at  the  Marne,  since  the  Germans  were  compelled  to  recall  troops 
from  the  west  and  divert  reinforcements.  In  the  operations  East 
Prussia  was  devastated  and  the  refugees  fled  as  far  as  Berlin. 
On  the  other  hand,  Russia  lost  one  of  its  best  armies  and  an  in- 
calculable amount  of  artillery  and  munitions.  It  was  an  expen- 
sive sacrifice. 


LEMBERG  (SEPT.  1) 

But  the  East  Prussian  operation  was  only  a  minor  incident. 
The  main  Russian  forces  had  already  entered  Galicia  from  the 
east  and  at  the  moment  of  Tannenberg  had  attacked  and  routed 
the  main  Austrian  armies,  driving  them  through  Lemberg  and 
as  far  as  Jaroslav  in  utter  rout,  taking  thousands  of  prisoners  and 


Page  Thirteen 


FIRST    YEAR    OP    THE    GREAT    WAR 

immense  stores  of  ammunition.     A  similar  fate  overtook  the  army 
which  the  Austrian*  had  sent  north  against  Lublin. 

Thus,  while  the  Germans  were  failing  in  their  grandiose 
effort  for  a  decision  in  France,  the  Russians  were  achieving  what 
now  appeared  to  be  a  real  decision  over  Austria  in  Galicia. 
Coupled  with  the  Serbian  victory  at  the  Jedar,  the  Lemberg  dis- 
aster seemed  to  promise  the  speedy  disintegration  of  the  hetero- 
geneous Austrian  armies.  With  her  French  hopes  turned  to  ashes, 
Germany  had  now  to  face  east  to  save  her  ally. 

THE  FIRST  WARSAW  DRIVE  (Ocr.  1-20) 

German  attempt  to  save  Austria  took  the  shape  of  a  sudden 
drive  at  Warsaw,  through  Central  Poland.  Russia  had  made 
two  great  efforts,  the  chief  endeavor  directed  against  Austria, 
which  had  succeeded,  the  second  against  East  Prussia,  which  had 
failed.  But  in  doing  this  she  had  left  Central  Poland  bare  of 
troops,  and  Germany  now  struck  straight  through  the  unguarded 
center  at  Warsaw  in  an  attempt  to  seize  this  great  fortress  town 
before  Russia  could  get  back  from  Galicia  a  sufficient  force  to 
check  the  thrust 

This  drive  began  in  the  first  days  of  October,  was  directed 
by  Hindenburg  and  almost  succeeded.  German  troops  actually 
reached  the  suburbs  of  Warsaw,  and  its  fall  was  expected.  But 
Russian  reinforcements  arrived  in  time,  the  German  flank  was 
turned  and  a  speedy  retreat  was  necessary.  Without  any  real 
battle  the  Germans  swiftly  and  succinctly  flowed  back  across  their 
own  frontiers. 

Momentarily,  however,  they  had  achieved  their  purpose  in 
relieving  the  Austrians.  The  Russians,  having  sent  corps  to  War- 
saw, were  compelled  to  retreat  behind  the  San.  Przemysl,  which 

Pagt  Fourteen 


BY     FRANK    H.     S  I  M  O  N  D  S 

had  been  besieged,  was  relieved,  and  for  the  moment  Austria 
was  saved.  As  an  example  of  daring  and  successful  strategy  the 
first  drive  at  Warsaw,  although  it  failed  to  take  the  city,  cannot 
be  praised  too  highly. 

LODZ  (Nov.  19) 

The  pause  in  the  Galician  campaign,  however,  proved  only 
momentary.  While  the  Germans  were  retreating  from  Warsaw, 
the  Russians  renewed  their  offensive,  recrossed  the  San,  reinvested 
Przemysl,  penetrated  to  the  suburbs  of  Cracow  and  approached 
and  even  passed  the  Carpathian  barrier,  sending  Cossack  raiders 
over  into  Hungary.  A  new  effort  to  save  Austria  was  inevitable. 

The  second  effort  was  far  more  considerable.  It  began  in  the 
early  days  of  November  and  was  made  by  a  great  German  army, 
many  corps  being  recalled  from  the  west,  where  the  Battles  of 
Flanders  were  ending  and  the  whole  campaign  falling  to  trench  war. 

Russian  forces,  pursuing  the  Germans  retreating  from  War- 
saw, had  approached  the  Posen  and  Silesian  frontiers  and  were 
across  the  Wartha.  Hindenburg  now  gathered  up  his  armies, 
which  were  facing  the  Russians  west  of  the  Wartha,  moved  them 
rapidly  over  strategic  railroads  to  the  north  and  sent  them  in  upon 
the  Russian  flank  in  a  desperate  effort  to  cut  the  Russians  off  from 
Warsaw,  envelop  them  and  either  surround  them  or  drive  them 
south  away  from  the  railroads. 

Again  the  Germans  almost  succeeded.  At  one  time  they 
actually  interposed  between  the  Russians  and  their  base,  cutting 
the  railroad,  northeast  of  Lodz.  For  days  a  desperate  struggle 
went  on  about  Lodz.  In  the  end,  after  suffering  terrific  losses,  the 
Russians  were  saved  by  reinforcements  brought  from  Warsaw  and 
were  able  to  get  back  behind  the  Bzura-Rawka  rivers  west  of  War- 
Pa^  Fifteen 


FIRST    YEAR    OF    THE    GREAT    WAR 

saw  and  there  to  repulse  all  German  attacks.     By  December  1  the 
front  in  this  sector  had  become  fixed  on  lines  it  was  to  hold  until 

July. 

PRZEMYSL  AND  THE  CARPATHIANS  (DEC.  TO  MAY). 

Once  more  the  Russian  armies  in  Galicia  had  been  compelled 
to  retire  in  consequence  of  a  German  offensive  in  Poland.  But  this 
time  they  came  back  only  to  Tarnow  and  took  up  a  strong  posi- 
tion behind  the  Dunajec-Biala  rivers.  Henceforth  their  main 
effort  was  directed  at  forcing  the  passes  of  the  Carpathians  and 
breaking  into  the  Hungarian  Plain.  To  do  this  it  was  essential  to 
reduce  the  fortress  of  Przemysl,  which  commands  the  main  rail- 
ways and  roads  of  Galicia.  From  January  1  to  May  I  the 
Galician  campaign  was  marked  by  a  slow  but  steady  advance  of 
the  Russians  toward  and  through  the  mountains,  halted  frequently 
by  desperate  Austro-German  offensives,  for  German  troops  and 
officers  were  now  sent  to  stiffen  the  shaken  Hapsburg  forces. 

Austrian  resistance  was  materially  strengthened  also  by  the 
recall  of  three  corps  which  had  been  dispatched  to  Serbia  to  share 
in  the  invasion  of  that  kingdom.  This  invasion  had  passed  Bel- 
grade and  seemed  about  to  crush  Serbia,  when  the  recall  of  Aus- 
trian troops  made  possible  a  new  Serbian  offensive,  and  the 
Austrian  invading  forces  were  terribly  beaten  in  the  first  days  of 
December  about  Valiev«  and  driven  out  of  the  kingdom. 

Przemysl  fell  on  March  22,  and  immediately  thereafter 
Russia  made  her  final  bid  for  a  decision  in  the  east.  The  surren- 
der had  eliminated  125,000  Austrian  troops  and  freed  many  more 
Russians.  In  the  opening  days  of  April  the  whole  Russian  battle 
line  along  the  Carpathians  swept  forward.  For  four  weeks  the 
fighting  was  terrific  and  the  progress  favorable  to  the  Russians. 

Page  Sixteen 


BY    FRANK    H.     S  I  M  O  N  D  S 


But  by  May  1  they  were  brought  to  a  complete  halt,  having  still 
failed  to  enter  the  Hungarian  Plain.  Their  hope  of  a  decision 
had  also  failed.  They  had  been  unable  to  crush  Austria,  as 
Germany  had  failed  to  crush  France.  It  was  now  time  for  a  new 
German  effort. 

To  complete  the  review  of  events  in  the  east  it  is  necessary 
to  mention  the  great  German  victory  in  the  Mazurian  Lakes 
region  on  February  tO,  which  terminated  a  Russian  counter- 
offensive  in  East  Prussia,  designed  to  relieve  Russian  armies  in 
Poland  and  Galicia  by  recalling  German  troops.  A  huge  num- 
ber of  prisoners  were  claimed  by  the  Germans,  who  once  more 
demonstrated  their  complete  superiority  to  the  Russians  in  the 
field. 

III.     Germany  Against  Russia 

All  hope  of  a  decision  in  the  west  ended  with  the  repulse 
of  the  Germans  in  Flanders  in  November;  in  fact,  it  had  practi- 
cally terminated  when  the  beaten  German  masses  had  retreated 
from  the  Marne.  Germany  had  undertaken  to  dispose  of  France 
at  one  blow,  and  France  had  escaped.  Belgium  and  the  indus- 
trial regions  of  Northeastern  France  remained  in  German  hands, 
a  rich  prize,  protected  by  the  strong  defensive  lines  which  the  Ger- 
man armies  held  from  Switzerland  to  the  sea.  But  there  was  no 
longer  any  prospect  that  a  new  German  offensive  could  reach 
Paris  or  crush  the  Allies. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  might  still  be  possible  to  win  the  war 
if  Russia  could  be  eliminated.  If  Germany,  while  holding  all 
of  her  western  conquests,  could  dispose  of  Russia  as  she  had 
hoped  to  dispose  of  France,  there  was  still  time  to  win  a  great 
triumph,  make  peace  on  terms  which  would  be  wholly  advantage- 
ous, i-f  not  as  favorable  as  had  been  hoped  for  in  August,  1914. 

Page  Seventeen 


FIRST     YEAR    OF    THE    GREAT     WAR 

While  the  world  was  talking  of  a  spring  drive  of  the  Allies 
Germany  was  steadily  preparing  for  a  great  offensive  of  the  com- 
bined Austro-German  forces,  which  should  relieve  the  Russian 
menace  to  Hungary,  clear  Galicia,  take  Warsaw  and.  if  pos- 
sible, crush  Russian  military  power  so  completely  that  Russia 
would  ask  for  peace  or  cease  to  be  a  factor  for  many  months. 

The  long  series  of  French  offensives  in  the  west  in  the  late 
winter  and  spring  had  demonstrated  that  the  German  lines  would 
hold.  The  failure  of  the  British  to  get  up  Kitchener's  million  or 
to  provide  the  ammunition  necessary  for  a  successful  advance 
offered  the  new  chance.  In  April  Germany  turned  her  attention 
to  Russia  with  the  same  purpose  and  the  same  possibilities  that 
led  to  the  earlier  offensive  against  France. 

GALICIA  (MAY  AND  JUNE). 

At  the  opening  of  the  great  German  offensive  against  Rus- 
sia the  armies  of  the  Czar  in  Galicia  were  in  the  Carpathians, 
their  flank  toward  Germany  protected  by  strong  defensive  works 
behind  the  Dunajec-Biala  rivers. 

The  first  operation  was  directed  against  this  flank,  which 
was  suddenly  struck  by  a  huge  army  under  Mackensen  provided 
with  an  enormous  artillery  train.  In  a  few  days  the  entire  front 
crumpled  up,  uncovering  the  rear  of  the  armies  in  the  Carpathians. 
Along  the  Dunajec  the  Russians  suffered  a  real  disaster,  losing 
thousands  in  prisoners.  In  the  first  stages  of  their  retreat  more 
thousands  were  captured  and  the  whole  Carpathian  army  was 
threatened  in  front  by  the  Austrian  armies  coming  from  Hungary, 
in  flank  and  rear  by  the  German  troops  coming  east  in  Galicia 

Efforts  to  stand  at  the  Wislok,  the  San  and  at  the  Grodek 
lakes  failed.  Although  the  Russian  resistance  steadily  stiffened, 

I'agr   Eigkttt* 


BY    FRANK     H.     S  I  M  O  N  D  S 


the  German  advance  could  not  be  checked.  Jaroslav  Przemysl 
and  finally  Lemberg  were  recaptured  and  the  Russians  were 
driven  into  Poland  and  east  toward  the  Bessarabian  frontier.  All 
but  a  thin  strip  of  Galicia  was  reconquered,  after  having  been 
occupied  by  Russia  since  September. 

Russian  disaster  was  explained  by  the  lack  of  ammunition 
and  by  the  great  superiority  of  German  artillery.  Probably  this 
explains  the  rapidity  of  the  debacle,  but  the  Russians  were  clearly 
outnumbered,  outgeneralled  and  outfought. 

THE  THIRD  DRIVE  AT  WARSAW  (JULY). 

Once  Galicia  was  cleared  the  full  extent  of  German  purpose 
was  revealed.  Glance  at  the  map  and  it  will  be  seen  that  Rus- 
sian Poland  extends  into  German  and  Austrian  territory,  which 
grips  it  something  like  a  pair  of  jaws.  Warsaw,  the  western-most 
fortress  of  the  Russian  defensive  line,  is  outflanked  by  German 
East  Prussian  territory  and  by  Austrian  Galician  districts. 

Very  shortly  it  became  clear  that  the  plan  of  the  Austro- 
German  commanders  was  to  attack  Warsaw  frontally  along  the 
familiar  Rawka-Bzura  front  and  at  the  same  time  to  attack  the 
defensive  lines  that  covered  the  railroads  from  Kiev,  Moscow 
and  Petrograd  to  the  Polish  capital.  If  these  lines  in  the  rear  fell 
before  Warsaw  was  evacuated  all  the  Russians  west  of  the  closing 
jaws  would  be  cut  off,  surrounded,  ultimately  captured;  the  greater 
part  of  Russian  military  strength  would  be  eliminated. 

If  Warsaw  were  evacuated  in  time  the  Russian  front  would 
be  thrown  back  from  the  Vistula  to  the  Bug,  the  Austro-German 
allies  would  gain  a  tremendously  strong  defensive  line,  having 
conquered  most  of  Poland,  and  they  might  expect  that  Russia 
would  seek  peace,  or  at  least  be  compelled  to  conduct  a  relatively 

Page  Ninetttn 


FIRST     YEAR    OF    THE    GREAT     WAR 

harmless  defensive  operation  far  within  her  own  territory  for  many 
months. 

The  main  object  was,  of  course,  to  dispose  of  the  Russian 
armies  by  enveloping  and  capturing  them.  This  would  in  all 
probability  mean  a  decision,  but  short  of  this,  if  the  Russian  armies 
were  completely  routed,  with  Austrian  and  German  territory 
freed  of  invaders,  with  victorious  German  armies  standing  in 
Belgium,  Poland  and  Northern  France,  Germany  might  expect 
to  hear  from  her  foes  some  proposals  for  peace,  which  would  be 
based  on  the  full  recognition  of  her  conquests  and  achievements. 

These  lines  were  written  with  the  fate  of  Warsaw  still  in 
doubt.  The  Austrian  and  German  jaws  are  still  closing  steadily 
behind  Warsaw,  but  the  Russian  resistance  is  desperate  and  so 
far  sustained.  At  the  moment  Germany  is  as  near  to  a  decision 
as  she  was  in  France  in  September  of  last  year.  But  if  the  Rus- 
sian armies  hold,  as  the  French  did  at  the  Marne,  or  escape,  as 
they  did  in  the  Great  Retreat,  Germany  will  miss  the  great  deci- 
sion, even  if  she  takes  Warsaw. 

IV.     Allied  Offensives 

The  first  campaign  in  the  west  ended  with  the  Battles  of 
Flanders  on  November  15.  It  left  the  Allied  armies  victorious, 
to  the  extent  that  they  had  parried  the  great  German  design  to 
dispose  of  France.  It  left  them  holding  lines  which  had  endured 
the  shock  of  terrimc  attack,  but  it  left  them  shattered  and  to  some 
extent  disorganized.  The  first  British  expeditionary  army  had 
disappeared  in  casualties.  France  had  lost  at  least  three-quarters 
of  a  million  men.  It  was  necessary  to  reorganize  all  the  Allied 
armies,  to  attempt  to  overtake  the  Germans,  whose  preparation 
and  foresight  had  almost  won  them  the  decision. 

Pagr   Twenty 


BY    FRANK    H.     S  I  M  O  N  D  S 

Once  this  reorganization  was  achieved  and  preparation  began 
to  go  forward  it  was  necessary  to  attempt  offensive  operations  not 
alone  to  get  the  Germans  out  of  France,  where  their  hold  upon  the 
mineral  and  industrial  districts  was  crippling  the  French,  but  also 
to  relieve  the  pressure  upon  Russia  and  thus  assist  the  great  Russian 
offensive  in  Galicia.  These  attempts  stretch  from  January  to  July 
and  are,  with  one  exception,  an  uninterrupted  series  of  local  suc- 
cesses, yet  wholly  barren  of  any  but  the  smallest  local  advantage. 
Great  as  is  the  place  they  have  occupied  in  the  news  of  recent 
months,  tremendous  as  have  been  the  losses  to  the  forces  engaged, 
they  have  left  the  battle  lines  hardly  changed  and  require  no  de- 
tailed examination. 

FRENCH  OFFENSIVES  (JANUARY  TO  JULY) 

The  main  effort  in  the  west  has,  of  course,  been  made  by  the 
French.  In  the  past  six  months  a  sustained  attack  has  been  made 
in  each  sector.  Thus  in  January  the  first  offensive  broke  out  north 
of  the  Aisne  and  east  of  Soissons.  Local  advances  were  made, 
but  a  flood  carried  away  the  Aisne  bridges  and  the  Frenck  were 
obliged  to  evacuate  not  only  the  ground  gained,  but  the  ground 
held  by  the  British  in  the  early  days  of  the  general  Allied  advance 
after  the  Battle  of  the  Marne.  This  was  the  one  complete  failure. 

In  February  a  new  effort  was  made  in  Alsace  and  French 
troops  broke  out  of  the  Thur  Valley  below  Than  and  touched  the 
Alsatian  Plain.  Their  advance  was  checked  within  sight  of 
Miilhausen  and  they  were  crowded  back  to  the  hills.  The  oper- 
ation terminated  with  real  gain  to  the  French,  but  they  failed 
utterly  to  gain  a  foothold  on  the  plain. 

A  third  effort  in  Champagne  led  to  much  more  severe  fight- 
ing and  to  terriffic  losses  on  both  sides.  Not  less  than  half  a 

Pagt  Twenty-one 


FIRST     YEAR    OF    THE    GREAT     WAR 

million  men  fought  for  nearly  a  month  on  the  narrow  front  between 
Rheims  and  the  Argonne,  the  French  striving  to  get  hold  of  the 
railroad,  which  supplied  the  German  front  west  of  Vouziers. 
Slight  progress  and  actual  failure  to  attain  the  object  marked  this 
effort  A  fourth  venture  about  St.  Mihiel  brought  back  only  in- 
significant profits. 

The  most  successful  French  advance  was  made  in  May,  north 
of  Arras,  and  resulted  in  the  capture  of  the  Lorrette  heights  and  a 
number  of  villages  west  of  Lens.  But  once  more  the  main  ob- 
jective was  not  attained.  The  city  of  Lens  did  not  fall  and  the 
German  lines,  thinned  to  reinforce  the  eastern  armies,  were  not 
broken.  In  fact,  the  Germans  were  able  to  organize  a  counter- 
offensive  and  win  back  considerable  lost  ground.  These  various 
offensives  cost  the  French  not  less  than  750.000  in  casualties  and 
achieved  no  material  advantage. 

BRITISH  FAILURE  (NOVEMBER  TO  JULY) 

As  to  the  British  efforts  since  the  Battles  of  Flanders,  they 
may  be  comprehended  in  the  simple  statement  that  the  British  army 
has  been  unable  to  accomplish  any  serious  offensive  result  since  the 
middle  of  last  November.  The  single  ambitious  bid  for  success  at 
Neuve  Chapelle  in  March  ended  in  a  terribly  expensive  local  vic- 
tory, but  the  gain  here  was  offset  by  loss  of  trenches  in  the  Second 
Battle  of  Ypres  in  April.  A  determined  effort  to  support  the 
French  operations  about  Arras  failed  completely  because  of  lack 
of  ammunition. 

Since  March  the  British,  now  numbering  perhaps  half  a  mil- 
lion, have  held  their  ground  with  little  but  trench  fighting,  in  which 
their  losses  have  been  heavy.  Not  less  than  300,000  British  have 
now  been  killed,  wounded  or  captured  in  the  western  field.  But 


BY    FRANK     H.     S  I  M  O  N  D  S 


the  failure  of  the  government  to  provide  ammunition  has  halted,  and 
still  holds  up,  any  British  offensive.  All  talk  of  a  "Spring  Drive" 
has  proved  mere  moonshine,  and  there  remains  some  doubt  as  to 
whether  the  British  will  be  able  to  undertake  any  serious  offensive 
before  next  Spring. 

THE  DARDANELLES  (FEBRUARY-JULY) 

Three  circumstances  produced  the  Allied  offensive  designed 
to  take  Constantinople,  by  forcing  the  Dardanelles.  Turkey's 
entrance  into  the  war  in  November  had  closed  Russia's  Black  Sea 
ports.  Winter  was  sealing  up  the  Arctic  and  Pacific  ports.  Rus- 
sia's need  for  munitioning  was  plain.  This  was  the  chief  circum- 
stance. Again,  Turkish  troops  were  undertaking  an  offensive 
against  Egypt  which  threatened  British  power  at  the  very  keystone 
of  the  imperial  arch.  Finally,  the  fall  of  Constantinople  was 
bound  to  exercise  a  profound  influence  upon  Italy  and  the  Balkan 
States. 

The  first  attempt  was  made  by  the  Anglo-French  fleet  with- 
out land  forces.  The  operation  began  on  February  19,  was 
marked  by  initial  successes,  and  was  completely  checked  by  the 
sinking  of  three  battleships  on  March  18.  What  many  critics  had 
foretold  had  now  happened ;  it  had  again  been  demonstrated  that  a 
naval  operation  of  this  sort  without  the  help  of  landing  forces  could 
not  succeed.  It  was  necessary  to  have  recourse  to  a  new  expedi- 
tion; the  Turks  were  warned  in  advance  of  what  was  coming  and 
Allied  prestige  in  the  Balkans  was  severely  shattered.  On  the 
other  hand,  Italian  participation  was  hastened  and  Turkey's  attack 
upon  Egypt  ended. 

A  month  later  an  Anglo-French  expeditionary  army  was 
landed  on  the  Gallipoli  peninsula,  after  an  engagement  which 

Page  Twenty-three 


FIRST    YEAR    OF    THE    GREAT    WAR 

brought  heavy  casualties  to  the  invaders.  For  many  weeks  there- 
after the  land  forces  were  unable  to  make  any  advance.  The  sup- 
port of  the  fleet  was  hindered  by  the  operations  of  a  German  sub- 
marine, which  scored  on  two  more  battleships.  Only  in  recent 
weeks  has  there  been  progress  by  the  Allies,  and  they  have  not  yet 
reached  the  first  permanent  position  of  the  Turks. 

Whether  the  Dardanelles  expedition  was  wise  or  foolish,  a 
point  much  debated,  it  is  plain  that  it  has  been  badly  managed,  has 
so  far  failed  to  make  any  serious  progress  and  that  the  ultimate 
capture  of  Constantinople  is  still  open  to  question.  On  the  other 
hand,  it  is  necessary  to  recognize  that  the  failure  of  Germany  to 
take  Warsaw,  or  even  in  taking  Warsaw  to  capture  the  Russian 
armies,  if  followed  by  the  fall  of  Constantinople,  would  mean  that 
the  German  attempt  to  dispose  of  Russia  had  terminated,  for  once 
the  Dardanelles  are  forced  Russia  will  be  able  to  munition  and 
equip  her  millions,  who  are  only  waiting  for  arms.  The  fall  of 
Constantinople  will  necessarily  settle  the  attitude  of  the  Balkans, 
certainly  bring  Greece  into  the  anti-German  line,  and  probably 
Rumania.  Allied  defeat,  on  the  contrary,  will  mean,  if  not  a 
disaster,  an  irremediable  repulse.  At  the  close  of  the  first  year 
Warsaw  and  Constantinople  are  the  critical  points  in  the  situation. 

ITALIAN  OPERATIONS  (MAY  23-JuLY  23) 

Italy  declared  war  upon  Austria  on  May  23.  The  nature 
of  her  frontier,  hemmed  in  by  the  Austrian  mountains  from  the 
Isonzo  to  Switzerland,  her  northern  provinces  open  to  attack  from 
the  fortified  places  of  the  Austrian  Tyrol,  made  it  inevitable  that 
her  efforts  for  many  months  would  be  confined  to  attempts  to  clear 
her  own  frontiers  of  the  Austrians  and  close  the  gateways  leading 
to  her  own  regions  and  held  by  her  foes.  Such  offensives  as  she 

Pagt   Twenty  four 


BY    FRANK    H.     S  I  M  O  N  D  S 


could  undertake  in  addition  would  naturally  be  directed  at  Trieste 
and  the  Italian-speaking  districts  east  of  her  frontiers. 

At  the  close  of  two  months  of  war  Italy  is  still  striving  to 
penetrate  into  the  Trentino  about  the  fortress  of  Trent,  to  cut  the 
railroad  lines  serving  the  Austrian  Tyrol  by  the  Pusterthal,  to  sur- 
round and  reduce  the  whole  Tyrolean  salient  south  of  the  Brenner 
Pass.  So  far  she  has  made  slight  but  unimportant  progress,  and 
is  still  outside  the  first  lines  of  Austrian  defence  in  the  Adige 
Valley,  along  the  Pusterthal  and  south  of  the  Stelvio. 

Between  the  Julian  Alps  and  the  sea,  on  the  front  from 
Tolmino  to  Nebresina,  Italian  troops  have  in  several  places  passed 
the  Isonzo,  have  taken  Montfalcone  and  Gradisca,  and  are  now 
pressing  in  upon  Gorizia.  Here  Italian  troops  have  encountered 
the  first  line  of  Austrian  defences,  and  have  for  many  days  been 
engaged  in  a  severe  and  expensive  conflict.  It  is  not  yet  clear 
whether  the  Italians  have  made  the  progress  their  bulletins  claim; 
if  they  have,  the  fall  of  Gorizia  and  the  capture  of  Trieste  are  at 
hand. 

But  it  is  well  to  recall  that  these  successes  will  not  have  any 
serious  effect  upon  Austrian  defence,  and  the  road  to  Vienna  will 
still  remain  barred  by  many  forts  and  mountains,  while,  until  the 
Trentino  salient  is  reduced,  Italy  will  always  have  to  fear  a  Ger- 
man offensive  from  the  Brenner.  As  yet,  then,  the  Italian  cam- 
paign has  but  begun,  and  the  difficulties  of  the  territory  make  it 
unlikely  that  Italy  can  exercise  any  great  influence  upon  the  whole 
combat  for  many  weeks  to  come.  Certainly  she  has  not  been  able 
to  force  the  Austrians  to  recall  their  masses  from  the  Warsaw 
drive. 

Page  Twenty-five 


FIRST    YEAR    OP    THE    GREAT     WAR 

Summary 

Of  the  four  major  efforts  described  above,  the  first,  the  Ger- 
attack  on  France,  failed  to  dispose  of  France.  Its  initial 
were  due  to  the  violation  of  the  Belgian  frontier,  and 
when  the  French  army  had  been  reconcent rated  it  outfought  the 
German,  heavily  defeated  it,  but  in  its  turn  failed  to  force  the 
Germans  out  of  a  large  district  of  Northern  France,  which  had 
been  occupied  in  the  dash  from  Belgium. 

The  French  achievement  was  wholly  unexpected  to  the 
Germans  and  remains  an  enduring  monument  both  to  French  sol- 
diers and  to  the  French  command.  In  this  campaign  the  British 
part  was  slight  until  the  Battles  of  Flanders,  but  here  the  British 
won  a  remarkable  triumph  against  great  odds  and  saved  the 
Channel  ports.  German  failure  was  not  due  to  bad  generalship 
or  incidental  mistakes;  it  was  due  to  the  amazing  French  rally  and 
to  the  fact  that  what  had  been  attempted  was  beyond  the  capacity 
even  of  Germans.  But  the  nearness  to  victory  seems  to  have  justi- 
fied the  risk  taken. 

The  Russian  offensive  failed  because  of  the  ability  of  the 
Germans  to  reinforce  their  ally.  Whenever  the  Russians  had  only 
the  Austrians  to  deal  with  they  were  invariably  successful,  and  in 
September  were  on  the  point  of  crushing  all  Austrian  military 
strength.  But  against  the  Germans  they  proved  inferior  troops, 
successful  only  in  defensive  lines.  The  final  disaster  and  retreat 
from  Galicia  were  due  in  large  part  to  the  failure  of  their  supplies 
of  ammunition  and  their  lack  of  heavy  artillery.  But  it  is  necessary 
to  point  out  that  it  was  the  Germans  who  finally  defeated  the  great 
Russian  effort. 

Of  the  Allied  offensive  in  the  West  little  need  be  said. 
The  simple  fact  seems  to  be  that  the  trench  fighting  has  shown  the 

i'agt   Twtnty-tix 


BY    FRANK    H.     S  I  M  O  N  D  S 


extreme  difficulty  of  making  a  successful  advance;  the  Germans 
have  simply  dug  themselves  into  Northern  France,  and  are  able 
to  supply  the  men  and  ammunition  to  meet  any  offensive.  The 
greatness  of  the  French  losses  and  the  concomitant  failure  of  the 
British  to  get  up  men  or  feed  their  guns  explains  Allied  failure  in 
this  field,  and  there  is  no  present  promise  of  a  change.  German 
defence  here  has  been  as  brilliantly  successful  as  the  operations 
against  Russia. 

Of  the  fourth  major  campaign,  that  against  Russia,  it  is  only 
possible  to  say  that  it  is  still  going  forward,  and  that  in  its  earlier 
stages  it  has  been  as  successful  as  was  the  advance  on  Paris  before 
the  Battle  of  the  Marne.  It  is  chiefly  noteworthy  now  as  demon- 
strating the  enormous  resources  of  Germany  in  men  and  munitions, 
the  folly  of  earlier  predictions  of  approaching  German  exhaustion 
and  the  comparative  soundness  of  German  confidence  that  victory 
for  them  is  still  possible  or  even  likely. 

In  its  first  year  the  Great  War  has  been  Napoleonic  in  char- 
acter, but  no  Napoleon  has  appeared.  Germany  has  displayed 
the  same  ability  to  meet  Europe  in  arms  that  France  displayed 
from  1  792  to  1814.  All  prospect  of  early  peace  seems  to  have 
been  disposed  of  by  the  absence  of  any  really  decisive  result  in  any 
field.  Only  a  tremendous  Russian  disaster  can  now  modify  the 
general  expectation  that  the  war  will  continue  for  one  or  two  years. 

Finally,  it  is  accurate  to  say  that  in  the  military  operations  in 
Europe  all  the  real  advantage  has  lain  with  the  Germans.  They 
have  failed  in  their  greatest  undertaking,  but  they  have  cleared 
their  own  frontiers,  and  are  now  fighting  in  Poland,  Belgium  and 
France.  Their  armies  have  shown  no  sign  of  exhaustion  or  loss  of 
morale.  They  have  won  victories  which  will  forever  be  mem- 
orable. 


Page  Twenty-seven 


SECOND     YEAR    OP    THE    GREAT    WAR 


The  Great  War— Second  Year 

HE  first  year  of  the  Great  War  was  marked  by  three 
well  defined  campaigns:  the  opening  attack  upon 
France,  with  its  Belgian  prelude,  which  began  at  Liege 
and  culminated  in  the  defeat  at  the  Marne  and  the 
engagements  terminating  in  the  Battles  of  Flanders,  by  which  the 
deadlock  of  trench  war  was  made  absolute  from  the  sea  to  Switzer- 
land; the  Russian  attack  upon  Austria,  which  began  in  the  great 
victory  before  Lemberg,  was  continued  by  the  subsequent  victories 
in  Galicia  and  the  Carpathians,  until  in  the  closing  days  of  April 
Russia  stood  at  the  edge  of  the  Hungarian  plains  and  but  a  few 
miles  east  of  Cracow;  the  German  attack  upon  Russia,  which 
began  with  the  overwhelming  victory  at  the  Dunajec  about  May  1 
and  was  still  continuing  in  victory  on  the  first  anniversary  of  the 
coming  of  Armageddon. 

The  history  of  the  second  year  has  been  marked  by  five 
equally  well  defined  major  campaigns:  the  continuation  and  cul- 
mination of  the  great  German  attack  upon  Russia;  the  successful 
defensive  stand  of  Germany  in  the  west  from  August,  1915,  to 
February,  1916,  and  her  victorious  resistance  In  the  Battles  of 
Loos  and  Champagne;  the  splendidly  successful  Austro-German 
drive  through  Serbia  to  the  frontiers  of  Greece  and  Bulgaria;  the 
second  German  attack  upon  France  in  a  campaign  for  Verdun; 
finally,  as  the  year  closes,  the  beginning  of  a  grand  concentric 
Allied  attack  upon  Germany  and  Austria,  which  has  only  just 
opened,  but  has  already  deprived  Germany  and  her  ally  of  the 
offensive  on  all  fronts  for  the  first  time  in  the  entire  conflict. 

Accepting  these  divisions  as  the  basis  for  a  review  of  the 
year  and  ignoring  for  the  most  part  the  minor  and  subsidiary  opera- 

I'agr   Ttcrnty ngkt 


BY    FRANK    H.     S  I  M  O  N  D  S 


tions,  I  mean  now  rapidly  to  survey  these  four  great  German  cam- 
paigns and  touch  somewhat  briefly  upon  the  Allied  attack,  which 
is  just  beginning  and  has  as  yet  attained  no  decisive  result  in  the 
larger  sense,  either  in  the  East  or  the  West,  although  in  the  former 
field  its  progress  has  been  greater  than  any  other  advance  on  the 
Allied  side  during  the  whole  year. 

I.     Germany  and  Russia 

The  last  days  of  July,  1915,  saw  the  Austro-German  drive 
against  Russia  in  full  swing.  The  fate  of  Warsaw  was  in  doubt 
when  the  military  critics  were  casting  the  balance  for  the  first  year, 
but  it  was  not  long  to  be  in  doubt.  In  rapid  succession  the  for- 
tresses that  barred  the  advance  of  Hindenburg  from  East  Prussia 
fell;  Mackensen  stormed  on  between  the  Pripet  Marshes  and  the 
Vistula.  Warsaw  fell,  Ivangorod,  Novo-Georgievsk  followed  the 
fate  of  Maubeuge  and  Liege,  Warsaw  was  evacuated  and  the 
whole  Russian  line  reeled  backward  to  Brest-Litovsk  and  Kovno. 

But  there  was  no  halting  here.  North  and  south  the  peril 
of  envelopment  continued,  and  so  the  Russian  army  went  back 
behind  the  Dwina,  behind  the  Pinsk  Marshes,  and  the  Volhynian 
fortresses  of  Dubno  and  Lutsk  fell  to  the  Central  Powers.  Lem- 
berg  was  lost,  and  there  was  left  to  Russia  of  all  the  fruits  of  her 
great  Galician  campaign  only  a  tiny  sliver  of  Austrian  territory, 
the  Tarnopol  district. 

August  saw  the  whole  world  watching  to  know  if  the  Russian 
army,  the  main  army  retiring  from  Warsaw  and  Vilna,  would  be 
enveloped  and  captured.  A  Sedan  ten  times  magnified  seemed 
imminent,  and  for  a  time  German  cavalry  were  across  the  only 
line  of  retreat  of  the  greatest  Russian  army.  But  the  Russians 
escaped,  and  in  a  few  more  weeks  the  Eastern  campaign  had  come 

Page  Twenty-nine 


SECOND     YEAR    OF    THE    GREAT    WAR 

to  a  deadlock,  to  a  state  of  balance  and  a  condition  of  trench  con- 
flict like  the  Western. 

Well  might  the  Germans  and  the  Austrians  acclaim  their 
stupendous  achievement.  A  hundred  thousand  square  miles  of 
Russian  territory,  holding  before  the  war  over  fifteen  millions  of 
people,  had  been  conquered.  Prisoners  to  the  number  of  more 
than  a  million  had  been  captured.  Guns,  supplies  beyond  estimate, 
had  fallen  into  their  hands.  No  campaign  of  Napoleon's  had  been 
on  such  a  scale  and  no  success  of  Napoleon's  had  won  undisputed 
control  of  so  much  of  the  territory  of  one  of  the  great  powers  of 
his  own  time. 

A  STUPENDOUS  SUCCESS  THAT  FAILED 

Not  unnaturally  Vienna  and  Berlin  proclaimed  that  the 
Russian  phase  of  the  war  was  over.  Russia  had  received  a  blow 
from  which  it  would  take  her  years  to  recover  and  she  had  passed 
out  of  the  reckoning  for  the  term  of  the  present  war.  Indeed  the 
press  was  filled  with  the  reports  that  Russia  was  seeking  a  separate 
peace.  At  no  time  since  the  Battle  of  the  Mame  had  the  fortunes 
of  the  Central  Powers  seemed  so  prosperous,  and  the  German 
press  promised  its  readers  a  victorious  peace  before  snow  flew. 

Yet  the  truth  was  quite  different  Russian  armies  had  been 
terribly  defeated,  but  they  had  retained  their  form  and  escaped 
destruction  or  capture.  As  for  Russian  purpose,  in  the  hour  of 
dejection  the  Czar  himself  took  the  command  of  his  armies,  sent 
the  Grand  Duke  to  the  Caucasus  and  staked  his  dynasty  on  the 
continuance  of  the  war  and  the  restoration  of  Russian  military 
power.  Whether  his  act  was  spontaneous  or  the  result  of  the 
impulse  that  sprang  from  the  Russian  people  we  cannot  know,  but 
the  fact  is  that  it  was  the  first  step  in  the  wonderful  renaissance  of 

P»tt  Tkirty 


BY    FRANK     H.     S  I  M  O  N  D  S 


Russia,  the  consequences  of  which  are  now  unfolded  to  a  whole 
world  and  recognized  by  a  Berlin  that  marvels  as  it  confesses  the 
mistakes  of  its  calculations  of  the  previous  year. 

And  in  this  measure  the  German  drive  at  Russia  failed  as 
the  German  drive  at  France  had  failed.  France  had  parried  the 
blow  at  the  Marne  and  won  the  precious  time  necessary  to  reor- 
ganize her  own  military  resources  and  obtain  the  help  of  a  Britain 
still  for  long  months  to  be  unready. 

Bloody  battles  at  the  Dwina,  like  those  at  the  Yser,  failed 
to  change  the  Eastern  situation,  and  the  effort  to  get  Riga  failed 
as  the  struggle  for  Calais  had  failed.  Autumn  saw  the  end  of 
German  effort  in  the  East.  From  the  Carpathians  to  the  Gulf 
of  Riga  the  lines  were  to  stand  unchanged  until  the  Russian  flood, 
gathering  behind  this  dike,  should  once  more  burst  through  and 
overflow  into  Galicia. 

The  real  significance  of  the  German  failure  against  Russia 
was  to  be  appreciated  but  tardily  by  a  world  justly  impressed  by 
the  magnitude  of  the  conquests  in  territory  and  by  the  splendor  of 
the  achievements  of  German  generals  and  soldiers  on  the  field. 
For  many  months  France  and  Britain,  quite  as  much  as  Germany, 
were  convinced  that  Russia  had  shot  her  bolt,  and  a  period  of 
depression  set  in  which  was  to  endure  for  many  months.  Yet  not 
impossibly  the  failure  of  the  Central  Powers  in  the  summer  cam- 
paign may  be  reckoned  hereafter  as  the  beginning  of  the  end. 

II.     Germany's  Western  Stand 

The  closing  days  of  September  saw  the  long  promised  Allied 
attack  upon  the  German  lines  in  the  West.  After  many  months 
of  preparation,  after  a  relative  quiet  which  had  lasted  since  the 
desperate  and  abortive  French  efforts  in  Artois  in  May  and  June, 

Pagt  Thirty-ont 


SECOND  YEAR  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

the  French  in  Champagne,  the  British  in  Artois  launched  terriffic 
attacks. 

In  ten  days  of  bitter  fighting  the  French  advanced  some  three 
miles  on  a  front  of  eighteen,  took  above  25,000  prisoners  and 
many  guns;  they  penetrated  two  lines  of  Geiman  trenches  and  at 
one  point  actually  broke  through  the  third  and  last. 

But  the  result  was  nothing.  The  German  line  was  restored, 
the  French  attacks  were  beaten  down,  the  whole  offensive  was 
really  over  in  three  days,  and  in  a  week  the  world  knew  that  the 
French  had  failed,  although  the  considerable  number  of  prisoners 
and  the  large  capture  of  guns  misled  many  into  estimating  as  a  vic- 
tory what  had  been  a  defeat,  for  the  German  line  held. 

In  Artois  the  British  had  fared  even  less  well.  Their  initial 
success  was  considerable.  There  was  a  moment  when  the  capture 
of  Lens  seemed  inevitable,  but  old  faults  reappeared.  The  blun- 
ders of  Neuve  Chapelle  were  repeated  at  Loos;  supports  did  not 
come  up ;  ground  won  had  to  be  surrendered ;  for  great  sacrifices  in 
life  there  was  little  to  show.  The  failure  at  Loos  cost  Marshal  Sir 
John  French  his  command  and  it  condemned  the  British  army  to 
inaction,  the  British  people  to  depression  for  many  months.  It  was 
the  beginning  of  a  long  series  of  disasters  and  reverses. 

Here,  then,  was  one  more  German  success.  The  German 
lines  had  held,  although  masses  of  German  troops  had  been  sent 
to  the  East  in  the  great  attack  upon  Russia.  Some  of  these  had 
now  to  be  recalled,  and  the  failure  in  the  East  may  have  been  in- 
fluenced in  a  small  measure  by  the  Allied  pressure  in  the  West, 
but  only  a  little,  for  Russia  had  practically  escaped  when  the 
attack  began. 

Allied  failure  in  the  West  was  a  plain  testimony  to  the  fact 
that  Britain  was  not  yet  ready,  that  France  alone  could  not  free 

I'age   Thirty-two 


BY    FRANK    H.     S  I  M  O  N  D  S 

her  own  territory;  it  finally  denied  all  the  hopes  and  claims  of  the 
Allies  that  France  would  be  freed,  Belgium  liberated,  in  1915. 
The  spring  drive,  so  long  forecast,  came  only  in  the  closing  days  of 
September  and  had  terminated  in  failure  before  October  began. 

German  failure  in  the  East  had  been  strategic,  her  tactical 
victory  had  been  overwhelming;  that  is,  she  had  failed  to  capture 
or  destroy  the  Russian  armies,  but  she  had  beaten  them  in  every 
battle  and  had  gathered  in  great  booty  in  men,  in  guns,  in  territory. 
The  Allied  failure  was  both  tactical  and  strategic ;  it  was  absolute, 
not  relative;  and  conversely  German  success  in  the  West  was  abso- 
lute, because  Germany  had  there  obtained  exactly  what  she 
fought  for. 

III.     Germany  Goes  South 

Meantime  a  new  situation  demanded  German  attention.  The 
Allied  landing  at  Gallipoli  in  the  spring  of  the  year  had  imperilled 
Constantinople.  The  Turk  was  making  the  finest  fight  in  his 
splendid  fighting  history,  but  isolated  from  his  allies  by  a  hostile 
Serbia  and  an  unfriendly  Rumania,  lacking  in  munitions  and  in 
guns,  he  was  slowly  giving  evidences  of  an  increasing  weakness 
which  might  bring  collapse. 

Accordingly  Germany  and  Austria  planned  and  executed 
the  most  brilliant  and  successful  campaign  of  the  war.  While 
Allied  diplomatists  bargained  with  Greece  and  Bulgaria  and  re- 
strained Serbian  soldiers,  who  were  eager  to  attack  Bulgaria  before 
she  mobilized,  Germany  concentrated  a  great  army  on  the  Serbian 
frontier  along  the  Danube  and  the  Drina,  gave  the  command  to 
the  ever  victorious  Mackensen  and  prepared  to  open  the  road  to 
Stamboul,  to  Cairo  and  to  India,  as  German  prophets  proclaimed. 

At   the   agreed   moment   Bulgaria   mobilized   and   attacked 

Page  Thirty-three 


SECOND-YEAR    OF    THE    GREAT    WAR 

Serbia.  Greece  mobilized  and  remained  neutral,  Venizelos  was 
ousted  from  power  and  the  Serbian  ally  was  left  to  perish  under 
the  threefold  blow  that  was  now  to  fall.  And.  brave  as  was  the 
Serbian  resistance,  the  fall  was  immediate.  Austrian  and  German 
armies  pushed  south  and  east,  Bulgarian  armies  entered  Nish  and 
swept  Macedonia.  An  Anglo-French  army  arrived  too  late  to 
cover  the  retreat  of  the  Serbs  by  the  Vardar  and  only  a  broken 
fraction  escaped  to  the  Albanian  coast  and  found  asylum  in  Corfu. 
Serbia  and  Montenegro  were  completely  conquered  and  occupied, 
and  the  Central  Powers  paused  only  in  sight  of  Salonica,  where 
the  Allied  army  stood,  as  Wellingotn's  army  had  stood  behind 
the  lines  of  Torres  Vedras  when  Napoleon  swept  the  Iberian 
Peninsula. 

ON  THE  ROAD  TO  WORLD  POWER 

The  immediate  consequences  of  this  successful  campaign, 
which  was  as  short  as  it  was  decisive,  were  enormous.  The  Galli- 
poli  campaign  came  to  an  abrupt  standstill,  and  the  army,  which 
had  been,  according  to  Churchill,  within  a  mile  of  complete  success, 
was  now  exposed  to  deadly  peril,  from  which  it  was  to  escape  with 
difficulty  and  only  by  ignominious  retreat  a  few  months  later. 

A  British  army,  advancing  up  the  Tigris  Valley,  was  pres- 
ently to  met  disaster  and  be  compelled  to  surrender,  because  a 
great  Turkish  army,  munitioned  and  captained  by  Germans,  was 
freed  to  deal  with  it.  The  peril  of  invasion  was  to  approach  Suez 
and  threaten  Egypt,  while  Mahometan  tribes  in  the  desert  were  to 
begin  the  attack  in  the  rear.  Russian  armies  in  the  Caucasus  were 
to  be  halted  and  turned  back,  and  Teuto-Turkish  activity  was  to 
extend  to  Persia  and  win  brief  success. 

Berlin  now  proclaimed  that   Britain  was  to  be  brought  to 

Thirty  four 


BY    FRANK    H.     S  I  M  O  N  D  S 


terms  by  the  threat  at  Suez,  the  "heel  of  the  British  Achilles." 
British  prestige  in  the  whole  East  was  to  suffer,  and  the  disaster 
at  Gallipoli,  the  surrender  of  Kut-el-Amara,  were  to  abase  Britain 
in  her  own  and  the  world's  eyes  as  she  had  not  been  abased  in  a 
century. 

For  the  moment,  too,  Germany  had  broken  the  ring  of  steel 
about  her;  she  had  opened  her  road  to  the  East;  she  had  bound 
Byzantium  to  Berlin  and  to  Bagdad  by  the  railroad  she  had 
been  constructing  in  the  years  of  peace.  Napoleon  at  Wagram 
did  not  seem  more  sure  of  world  power  and  European  supremacy 
than  did  William  II.  in  the  days  immediately  following  the  Balkan 
campaign,  when  the  prospectuses  of  his  statesmen  and  his  journal- 
ists dazzled  the  world  and  silenced,  or  all  but  silenced,  the  Allied 
voices. 

BUT  No  VICTORIOUS  PEACE 

And  yet  the  actual  results  of  the  Balkan  success  were  pitifully 
small,  measured  by  the  situation  nine  months  later.  An  Allied 
army  forming  at  Salonica  acted  as  a  restraining  force  and  defended 
Egypt  from  the  Chalcidice.  A  minor  attack  upon  Suez  ended 
miserably.  In  due  course  of  time  the  Grand  Duke  stepped  for- 
ward and,  capturing  Trezibond  and  Erzerum,  threatened  Anatolia 
from  the  landward  side  and  swept  through  most  of  Armenia. 
Egypt  was  not  conquered  by  invasion,  nor  did  there  come  that 
internal  revolution  that  Berlin  so  confidently  forecast.  Turkey 
was  saved  temporarily;  the  Gallipoli  and  Mesopotamian  cam- 
paigns of  the  British  were  brought  to  nothing — to  worse  than 
nothing ;  Bulgaria  was  enlisted  and  Greece  kept  outside  the  Allied 
camp;  Serbia  and  Montenegro  were  transformed  into  new  Bel- 
giums,  and  Austria  swept  down  through  Albania  and  shepherded 
the  Italian  forces  into  Avlona.  But  this  was  all. 

Pag*  Thirty-fivt 


SECOND     YEAR    OF    THE    GREAT    WAR 

Germany  had  proclaimed  that  she  would  find  victorious  peace 
in  Constantinople,  as  she  had  proclaimed  that  it  was  to  be  won  in 
Warsaw  and  Brest-LJtovsk.  But  there  was  no  peace,  and  the 
Allies  at  Salonica  opened  a  new  front,  requiring  fresh  German  and 
Austrian  garrisons.  The  Balkan  Peninsula  became  for  the  Ger- 
mans what  the  Spanish  had  been  for  Napoleon,  and  Salonica  at 
the  present  hour  continues  to  recall  Lisbon  and  the  lines  of  Torres 
Vedras,  although  Greece  still  refuses  the  role  of  Portugal. 

IV.     The  Second  Attack  on  France 

Peace — victorious  peace — having  still  escaped  her,  Germany 
turned  all  her  energies  to  forging  one  more  thunderbolt.  Her 
hands  were  now  free  to  deal  with  France  again.  Russia,  weak- 
ened and  bound  by  an  Arctic  winter,  was  out  of  the  war  for  many 
months,  if  not  forever.  Britain  was  still  unready,  palpably  un- 
ready. Germany  reasoned.  Salonica  was  claiming  British  and 
French  corps.  There  was  time  before  Russia  could  "come  back," 
before  Britain  could  get  ready,  to  make  a  final,  supreme  effort 
against  France  and  deal  with  her  and  dispose  of  her. 

So  from  November  to  late  February  Germany  prepared  that 
gigantic  attack  upon  Verdun  which  in  the  last  week  of  February 
suddenly  claimed  the  attention  of  the  world  and  for  many  weeks 
seemed  certain  to  end  in  a  crushing  French  defeat. 

But  Verdun,  after  the  first  chaos,  indecision  and  blundering, 
held.  The  broken  lines  were  destroyed;  Castelnau,  Petain,  Bal- 
fourier,  came,  and  came  in  time.  Before  the  old  forts  a  second 
line  was  erected  and  the  German  advance  was  halted.  The  repulse 
of  March  9  was  fatal  to  German  hopes  for  a  sudden  and  sweep- 
ing victory,  a  piercing  of  the  line,  such  as  France  had  sought  and 
missed  in  Champagne  in  September.  The  repulse  of  April  9  ended 

Pmffg   Thirty  six 


BY    FRANK    H.     S  I  M  O  N  D  S 


the  possibility  of  success  by  any  sudden  and  tremendous  general 
thrust.  Henceforth  Verdun  fell  to  the  level  of  a  siege  operation 
and  Germany  advanced  by  yards  over  mountains  of  her  own  dead, 
while  on  the  hills  acros  sthe  Meuse  new  French  lines  sprang  up 
until  the  Verdun  salient  became  the  strongest  sector  in  the  French 
front. 

Still  Germany  persisted  and  persists.  Her  generals  and  her 
statesmen  reasoned  that  France,  wearied  of  the  conflict,  unaided 
yet  by  British  counter  attack,  would  give  over  the  struggle;  the 
battle  for  Verdun  became  an  assault  upon  French  confidence, 
endurance,  nerves,  and  as  such  it  endured  for  five  months  and 
continues;  but  now  it  has  fallen  from  the  highest  estate  in  a  world 
war,  the  focal  point  in  the  attention  of  a  whole  planet,  and  become 
an  almost  forgotten  detail,  as  remote  as  Przemysl. 

Coincident  with  the  German  attack  upon  France,  Austria 
launched  a  drive  at  Italy  only  less  powerful  and  wholly  similar  in 
character.  Stripping  her  Eastern  lines  of  men  and  guns,  as  Ger- 
many had  stripped  her  Polish  and  Courland  fronts,  Austria  col- 
lected a  host  in  the  Trentino  and  struck  south  along  the  Adige 
and  Brenta  valleys,  the  historic  pathways  of  northern  invaders,  at 
Verona  and  Vicenza. 

THE  DARKEST  HOURS  FOR  THE  ALLIES 

Austrian  success  was  more  immediately  great  than  Ger- 
many's. Italian  resistance  crumbled;  the  mountains  and  valleys 
gained  in  the  earlier  attack  were  lost.  Austrian  troops  victoriously 
repassed  the  old  frontier  and  approached  the  plain  of  Venetia. 
For  weeks  the  Austrian  advance  pushed  slowly,  steadily  forward 
until  Italian  apprehension  became  great  and  an  Italian  Ministry 
fell.  It  remains  a  matter  for  conjecture  what  might  have  hap- 

Page  Thirty-seven 


SECOND  YEAR  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

pened  had  not  Austrian  troops  suddenly  been  recalled  by  a  new 
event  which  was  to  change  the  whole  character  of  the  war  and 
serve  as  the  opening  move  in  the  second  Allied  offensive. 

Never  in  the  war  had  Allied  prospects  looked  darker  than 
on  May  I,  when  the  Kut  surrender,  the  Austrian  advance,  the 
slow  but  sure  German  pressure  at  Verdun  all  bore  testimony  to 
the  strength  and  to  the  seeming  invincibility  of  the  arms  of  the 
Central  Powers,  and  the  press  talked  of  a  coming  German  attack 
upon  Russia  that  should  carry  to  completion  the  work  of  the  pre- 
vious summer  and  achieve  at  Moscow  what  had  been  missed  at 
Warsaw.  The  Irish  Rebellion  added  to  the  dismal  face  of  Allied 
prospects,  and  even  the  French  press  began  to  murmur  at  the  con- 
tinued quiescence  of  British  armies  and  the  magnitude  of  the  blood- 
tax  levied  upon  the  sons  of  the  Republic. 

V.     Germany  Loses  the  Initiative 

The  Russian  victories  in  Armenia  in  the  late  winter,  the  fall 
of  Erzerum  and  Trebizond,  had  been  plain  warning  that  Russian 
strength  was  gaining.  But  these  events  had  failed  to  impress  a 
world  watching  the  terrible  struggle  before  Verdun,  and  they 
carried  no  message  to  German  and  Austrian  generals,  who,  con- 
fident of  Russian  exhaustion,  continued  to  send  troops  from  the 
East  to  the  West  and  the  South. 

All  through  the  first  four  months  of  the  Verdun  attack  it  was 
plain  that  Germany  reckoned  on  precipitating  a  premature  offen- 
sive by  the  British,  and  before  their  lines  she  massed  most  of  the 
troops  withdrawn  from  Russia.  As  the  strain  upon  the  French 
increased,  the  British,  as  was  natural,  volunteered  to  begin,  but 
Joffre  did  not  count  them  yet  ready  and  grimly  held  the  French  to 
the  gigantic  task  on  the  Heights  of  the  Meuse. 

Page  Thirty-tight 


BY    FRANK    H.     S  I  M  O  N  D  S 


But  as  Verdun  held  out,  the  time  approached  when  Russia 
would  escape  from  the  chains  of  winter  and  the  Eastern  field 
would  again  be  fit  for  military  operations.  Still  the  world  awaited, 
not  a  Russian  attack,  but  that  Allied  offensive  which  had  been,  in 
the  minds  of  the  uninformed  of  neutral  and  belligerent  countries 
alike,  scheduled  for  the  spring;  and  when  it  did  not  come  credit 
was  given  to  German  assertions  that  the  Verdun  attack  had  ex- 
hausted France. 

On  June  1 ,  however,  there  came  a  sudden  awakening.  On 
a  vast  front  extending  from  the  Pripet  Marshes  to  the  Rumanian 
frontier  the  Russian  armies,  heralded  by  tremendous  artillery  oper- 
ations, stepped  forward,  broke  the  Austrian  lines  north  and  south, 
took  the  fortresses  of  Dubno  and  Lutsk,  lost  in  the  preceding  sum- 
mer, and  began  to  sweep  the  defeated  Austrian  armies  before  them 
in  a  rout  that  recalled  the  worst  of  the  Lemberg  disaster. 

In  a  month  the  total  of  prisoners  claimed  by  the  Russians 
passed  200,000;  it  has  since  reached  300,000.  Guns,  ammu- 
nition, supplies  of  every  sort,  fell  to  the  victors.  Bukovina  was 
retaken.  On  the  north  Kovel  was  threatened  and  in  the  south 
Kolomea  fell,  and  Cossacks  again  reached  the  summit  of  the  Car- 
pathians and  began  to  flow  down  the  Kirilibaba  and  Jablonitza 
passes  toward  the  Hungarian  Plain. 

Once  more  it  was  for  Germany  to  come  to  the  rescue  of  her 
Austrian  ally,  and  fresh  German  troops  pouring  down  from  the 
north  passed  Kovel  and  halted  the  Russians,  first  at  the  Styr  and 
then,  yielding  under  pressure,  retired  behind  Stokhod,  where  they 
still  hold.  On  the  Strypa  other  German  troops  held  firm,  but  to 
the  south,  across  the  Dniester,  the  Russians  continued  to  press  on, 
and  have  only  recently  slowed  down. 

Page  Thirty-nine 


SECOND  YEAR  OP  THE  GREAT  WAR 

RUSSIA'S  GREAT  OFFENSIVE 

Now,  after  seven  weeks,  it  is  too  early  to  forecast  the  final 
achievement  of  the  Russian  offensive.  It  goes  over  into  another 
year,  as  did  the  German  attack  upon  Russia  of  last  year,  which 
advanced  two  hundred  miles  beyond  its  July  limit  before  it  finally 
halted.  But  it  is  clear  that  the  Russian  attack  has  not  yet  been 
checked,  that  it  carries  a  plain  menace  for  Lemberg  and  that  it  has 
disclosed  an  Austrian  weakness  that  may  be  the  sign  of  an  ap- 
proaching collapse.  A  year  ago  Berlin  talked  of  a  separate  peace 
with  a  defeated  Russia;  to-day  Petrograd  is  talking  of  a  separate 
peace  with  an  exhausted  Austria.  Berlin  was  wrong;  not  im- 
probably Petrograd  is  wrong;  but  the  change  is  the  thing  to  be 
noted. 

In  the  seven  weeks  of  fighting  Russia  has  recovered  between 
10.000  and  15,000  square  miles  of  territory  lost  last  year,  far 
more  territory  than  Germany  holds  to  ransom  from  France,  a 
larger  area  than  Belgium.  What  the  moral  effect  upon  Rumania 
and  Bulgaria  will  be  when  the  Russian  victory  is  finally  established 
it  is  impossible  to  forecast;  but  it  is  possible  to  recall  the  effect  in 
the  Balkans  of  the  German  victories  in  Russia  a  year  ago.  and 
Bukovina  is  under  the  eyes  and  in  the  minds  of  all  Rumanians. 

Russian  victories  automatically  ended  the  Austrian  attack 
upon  Italy  and  Italian  armies  leaped  forward  to  recover  lost 
ground  and  are  still  making  progress.  Austrian  troops  were 
promptly  recalled  form  Albania  and  from  the  Balkans,  and  their 
going  was  the  signal  for  new  Allied  activity  about  Salonica,  which 
has  been  accepted  as  the  forerunner  of  an  effort  to  dispose  of 
Bulgaria,  free  Serbia  and  cut  the  railroad  line  that  binds  Berlin 
to  Constantinoule  and  the  Turk  to  the  Teuton.  Unmistakably, 
we  are  soon  to  have  a  new  campaign  in  the  Balkans — a  cam- 

Pagt  Forty 


BY     FRANK    H.     S  I  M  O  N  D  S 

paign  directed  north  and  south — an  effort  to  restore  the  iron  ring 
inclosing  the  Central  Powers  and  isolate  the  Turk,  who  may  not 
long  endure  if  he  loses  the  aid  of  his  great  German  ally. 

THE  WESTERN  ATTACK 

Exactly  one  month  after  the  Russian  armies  had  stepped  out 
in  Volhynia  and  Galicia  the  French  and  British  armies  along  the 
Somme  began  a  great  attack,  which  at  the  present  hour  is  going 
forward  and  still  remains  but  a  beginning. 

The  actual  achievement  of  this  Western  Drive,  still  too  small 
in  the  decisive  sense  to  have  any  bearing,  is  in  the  minds  of  all  who 
have  read  the  recent  newspapers.  We  must  wait  weeks  and  per- 
haps months  before  we  shall  know  whether  Britain — for  the  main 
work  must  be  done  by  Britain — can  repeat  in  Picardy  the  Russian 
achievement  in  Volhynia  and,  piercing  the  German  lines,  compel 
the  withdrawal  of  the  Teuton  from  French  territory  occupied  now 
for  nearly  two  years. 

Should  the  British  pierce  the  German  lines  for  half  the  dis- 
tance of  the  Russian  advance  upon  Kovel  by  Lutsk,  should  they 
recover  half  the  territory  adready  taken  by  the  armies  of  the  Czar, 
France  would  be  substantially  freed  of  German  troops.  But,  on 
the  other  hand,  should  the  British  advance  be  stopped  substantially 
where  it  now  stands,  the  German  success  would  be  as  absolute  as 
it  was  a  year  ago  in  Champagne  and  Artois,  and  in  both  instances 
the  small  area  of  recovered  territory  would  have  no  military  value 
and  the  minor  successes  on  the  firing  line,  trenches,  prisoners  and 
guns  taken,  would  not  modify  in  any  respect  the  absolute  victory 
of  Germany  on  the  defensive. 

Nor  can  we  now  form  any  estimate  of  the  capacity  of  the 
new  British  armies  just  beginning  their  gigantic  task.  Superficially 

Page  Forty-onr 


SECOND  YEAR  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

they  would  seem  already  to  have  done  better  than  they  did  at 
Neuve  Chapelle  and  Loos.  We  know  that  they  have  numbers, 
guns,  munitions,  things  they  have  not  before  had  since  the  Great 
War  began.  But  it  is  for  another  year  to  determine  whether  the 
British  armies  and  officers  are  yet  trained  to  the  point  of  employ- 
ing the  resources  now  in  their  hands. 

The  French  success  along  the  Somme  has  so  far  been  more 
considerable  than  the  British,  and  General  Foch  has  again  sus- 
tained the  great  reputation  acquired  in  the  decisive  phase  of  the 
Battle  of  the  Marne,  when  he  defeated  the  Germans  about  La 
Fere  Champenoise.  An  exhausted  France  has  blazed  forth  in  a 
new  victory,  wholly  local  and  without  present  decisive  character, 
to  be  sure,  but  a  victory  making  answer  to  the  German  claims  that 
France  had  been  put  out  of  the  war  by  the  sacrifices  exacted  at 
Verdun  and  that  France  was  now  at  the  end  of  her  resources  in 
men. 

VI.     Summary 

The  measure  of  the  meaning  of  the  Second  Year  of  the 
Great  War  is  perhaps  best  had  by  a  contrast  between  the  situa- 
tion as  it  ends  and  the  situation  a  year  ago.  We  did  not  know  then 
what  the  extent  of  the  German  victory  in  the  East  was  to  be.  But 
the  year  closed  while  Germany  was  still  going  forward  in  the 
greatest  campaign  of  the  war,  and  the  magnitude  and  extent  of  her 
conquests  and  victories  filled  the  whole  world  and  gave  form  to  the 
words  in  which  the  comment  on  the  end  of  the  first  year  was  made. 

One  year  later  the  change  is  unmistakable.  It  is  the  Central 
Powers,  Germany,  for  she  is  the  heart  and  head  of  the  war  in  her 
own  camp,  which  are  on  the  defensive  and  the  Allies  who  are  ad- 
vancing. In  remote  Armenia,  in  Volhynia,  in  Galicia.  in  the 
Baltic  provinces  and  in  Northern  France,  as  well  as  along  the 

Page  Forty-two 


BY    FRANK    H.     S  I  M  O  N  D  S 

Alps  in  the  Tretino  district,  Russian,  French,  British  and  Italian 
troops  are  attacking,  and  there  is  every  promise  of  a  new  offensive 
from  Salonica  aimed  at  Bulgaria  and  designed  to  liberate  Serbia. 

It  is  no  longer  possible,  as  it  was  in  1914  and  in  1915,  for 
Germany  to  move  troops  from  east  to  west  or  north  or  south  as 
one  field  after  another  became  interesting  or  unimportant  in  her 
calculations.  On  all  fronts  with  equal  pressure  the  flood  is  beat- 
ing upon  her  battle  lines,  and  in  the  southeastern  field  a  breach  has 
already  been  opened,  which  must  be  closed  before  long  if  the 
consequences  are  not  to  be  serious  for  the  Central  Powers. 

Three  times,  at  the  Marne,  in  Russia  and  in  the  Verdun 
attack,  Germany  has  sought  to  destroy  one  of  her  foes,  by  a  single 
colossal  blow  to  put  one  of  her  great  opponents  out  of  the  reckon- 
ing, as  Napoleon  disposed  of  Austria  at  Austerlitz,  Prussia  at 
Jena  and  Russia  at  Friedland,  in  the  prosperous  early  days  of  the 
imperial  drama.  Failing  in  all  three  attempts,  she  now  sees  the 
third  year  of  the  war  open  with  all  her  enemies  standing,  with 
France  unbroken,  Russia  returning  to  the  charge  with  numbers  and 
efficiency  which  evoke  unfailing  wonder  in  Berlin  and  undisguised 
apprehension  in  Vienna  and  Budapest.  Britain  has  now  millions 
where  she  had  tens  of  thousands  in  August,  1914,  and  hundreds 
of  thousands  a  year  ago. 

GERMANY  FAR  FROM  CONQUERED 

As  the  year  ends  we  have  a  full  measure  of  Germany's  diffi- 
culties and  dangers,  but  we  have  no  information  to  prove  her 
capacity  to  meet  them,  and  only  Allied  assertions  to  support  the 
belief  that  her  resources  are  exhausted,  her  economic  situation 
desperate  and  that  the  ever  growing  problem  of  food  continues  to 
worry  her  statesmen  and  weaken  her  people. 

Page  Forty-three 


SECOND     YEAR    OP    THE    GREAT    WAR 

We  perceive  that  Germany  has  lost  the  offensive,  but  we  are 
not  able  to  decide  whether  the  loss  will  prove  temporary  or  per- 
manent We  see  that  the  attack  on  all  sides  is  made  by  the  Allies, 
and  German  and  Austrian  effort  is  confined  to  meeting  these  at- 
tacks. so  far  successfully  in  the  west  and  unsuccessfully  in  the  east. 
We  have  the  allied  assertion  that  German  lines  are  now  too  ex- 
tended for  German  numbers  to  hold.  Of  this  we  lack  proof  as  yet. 
We  have  the  parallel  of  the  days  of  the  Civil  War  after  Gettys- 
burg frequently  called  to  our  mind,  and  Joffre,  following  Dela- 
croix, has  likened  Verdun  to  Gettysburg.  But  of  these  things  there 
is  yet  no  proof,  save  only  as  we  have  the  German  confession  that 
on  all  fronts  German  troops  and  the  troops  of  Germany's  allies 
are  outnumbered.  This,  after  all,  must  be  patent,  given  the  re- 
sources in  men  of  the  great  nations  combined  against  the  Central 
Powers  and  'he  enormous  casualty  lists  that  Austria  and  Germany 
have  suffered,  lists  that  must  now  in  killed,  wounded,  captured  and 
incapacitated  far  pass  the  7,000,000  mark. 

Yet  if  the  friends  of  the  Allies  now  turn  to  the  parallel  of  the 
Confederacy  it  is  plain  that  with  equal  justice  the  Germans  may 
point  to  the  achievements  of  Frederick  the  Great  and  the  heroic 
and  successful  resistance  of  Prussia  in  the  Seven  Years'  War,  when 
the  odds  were  far  greater  and  the  resources  of  Frederick  insignifi- 
cant in  comparison  to  those  of  his  many  foes.  We  may  say  with 
justice  that  in  losing  the  offensive,  the  initiative,  if  it  be  permanently 
lost,  in  failing  to  put  out  one  of  her  enemies  before  all  were  equally 
prepared,  Germany  failed  to  win  the  war  on  German  terms,  failed 
to  conquer,  and  the  second  year  of  the  war  has  seen  the  coming 
of  the  failure.  But  this  is  a  long  way  from  saying  that  Germany 
can  be  conquered. 


Pope 


BY    FRANK    H.     S  I  M  O  N  D  S 


No  PEACE  THIS  YEAR 

Bernhardi  forecast  German  defeat  if  Germany  failed  to  elimi- 
nate one  of  her  great  opponents  before  all  were  in  the  field  with 
equal  preparation.  But  Bernhardi's  prophecy  is  old,  and  the  war 
has  abolished  many  articles  of  faith  in  the  minds  of  all  observers, 
neutral  and  belligerent.  One  can  say  with  absolute  accuracy  is 
that  as  the  year  ends  there  is  unmistakable  evidence  that  a  new 
phase  has  begun,  the  phase  dominated  by  Allied  attack  upon  Ger- 
many, as  the  preceding  two  years  have  been  dominated  by  the 
great  German  offensive  combinations. 

It  follows  that  the  year  is  ending  without  the  smallest  promise 
of  peace.  There  is  no  prosepect  that  the  Allies  will  be  able  be- 
tween now  and  winter  to  win  a  victory  that  will  bring  Germany  to 
her  knees.  There  is  no  present  promise  that  Germany  will  be  able 
to  regain  the  initiative  and  in  the  same  time  accomplish  what  she 
failed  to  accomplish  at  the  Marne  and  about  Vilna.  Allied  suc- 
cesses, small  as  they  are,  will  hold  out  the  promise  to  the  Allies 
of  a  real  victory  next  year.  German  resistance,  maintained  as  it 
now  is,  will  sustain  the  German  belief  that  Germany  should  con- 
tinue the  war  until  she  is  able  to  make  a  peace  conforming  to  the 
extent  of  the  war  map. 

Every  outward  evidence  that  a  reasonable  man  can  accept 
points  to  another  year  of  war,  to  the  fulfillment  of  Kitchener's  fore- 
cast of  a  three  year's  war.  Nothing  is  yet  decided  save  that  Ger- 
many has  failed  to  crush  France  or  Russia  and  to  compel  Britain 
to  ask  peace  by  menaces  directed  on  land  at  Egypt  and  India  and 
on  water  at  the  sea-borne  trade  of  Britain  by  the  submarine.  Pos- 
sessing Belgium,  thousands  of  square  miles  of  Northern  France,  all 
of  Poland,  most  of  the  Baltic  provinces  and  much  of  Volhynia, 
the  Central  Powers  still  have  a  tremendous  booty,  which  is  not  yet 
counterbalanced  by  Germany's  lost  colonies  and  vanished  sea  trade. 

Page  Forty-five 


SECOND  YEAR  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

Finally,  holding  Serbia  and  having  enlisted  Bulgaria  and 
Turkey,  Germany  possesses  the  keys  to  that  "place  in  the  sun"  for 
which  her  statesmen  have  long  yearned,  and  no  man  can  believe 
that  she  will  surrender  them  and  forsake  her  allies  until  she  has 
suffered  defeats  which  are  not  yet  to  be  forecast.  Until  the  gate- 
way to  the  Near  East  is  bolted  at  the  Danube  again  talk  of  peace 
is  futile  short  of  that  hour  when  exhaustion  comes,  and  that  is  still 
far  away.  It  is  more  war,  not  peace,  that  the  year-end  promises — 
this  is  unmistakable. 


Forty-riM 


BY    FRANK    H.     S  I  M  0  N  D  S 


The  Great  War — Third  Year 


(D 


EASURED  by  the  expectations  on  the  second  anni- 
versary of  the  outbreak  of  the  World  War,  there 
is  no  mistaking  the  fact  that  the  third  year  has  been 
a  bitter  disappointment  to  the  Allies.  Recall  for  a 
moment  the  situation  on  the  first  of  August,  1916.  At  that  moment 
the  Russian  offensive  in  Bukowina  and  Galicia  had  surpassed  all 
previous  achievements  in  trench  warfare  on  the  Allied  side.  The 
armies  of  Brusiloff  were  pushing  forward  still,  and  Kovel  and  Lem- 
berg  seemed  equally  in  danger.  The  Russian  attack  had  begun 
in  June.  All  through  July  the  British  and  the  French  at  the 
Somme  had  pounded  on,  taking  thousands  of  prisoners,  many  guns, 
and  at  last  were  making  an  appreciable  change  in  the  battle  lines 
in  France.  On  August  1  the  Italian  guns  were  already  active,  pre- 
paring for  that  attack  which  in  a  few  days  was  to  win  Gorizia. 
Already  the  world  began  to  suspect  that  Rumania  was  on  the  point 
of  entering  the  Great  War.  Men  began  to  talk  of  the  liberation  of 
France,  the  fall  of  Trieste  and  of  Lemberg  and  the  restoration  of 
Allied  fortunes. 

It  is  clear  now  that  none  of  these  expectations  were  to  be 
realized  in  the  next  year,  and  it  is  equally  clear  that  there  never 
was  any  great  chance  of  their  being  realized.  In  the  first  and 
second  years  of  the  war  Germany  had  created  that  Mitteleuropa 
which  was  the  dream  of  her  politicians,  of  her  statesmen  and  of 
her  soldiers  for  twenty  years  before  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  and 
in  1 9 1  6-'  1  7  there  was  still  lacking  to  the  Allied  arms  the  strength 
to  break  down  the  trench  lines  which  Germany  had  stretched  along 
her  frontiers  and  beyond,  as  Rome  erected  similar  fence  lines  to 
hold  back  the  barbarians  between  the  Rhine  and  the  Danube. 

We  saw  in  this  year  1916  one  hope  after  another  crushed: 

Page  Forty-seven 


THIRD     YEAR    OF     THE    GREAT    WAR 

Rumania  laid  in  ruins;  the  Russian  offensive  beaten  down;  the 
Allied  drive  for  Cambrai,  St.  Quentin,  Douai  stopped  on  the  west- 
ern side  of  Bapaume. 

And  at  the  end  one  saw  Germany  proposing  peace,  while  the 
whole  world  for  the  first  time  began  to  question  whether,  after  all, 
it  was  possible  to  conquer  Germany;  whether,  after  all,  a  draw  in 
battle  and  a  white  peace  were  not  the  limits  of  possibility. 

One  more  disappointment  there  was — the  Russian  Revolu- 
tion, which  was  hailed  as  restoring  Russia's  battle  line  to  the 
Allies  and  as  disposing  of  the  corrupt  Romanoff  agents  and  tools 
who  sought  to  make  their  peace  with  Germany  and  betray  the 
Allied  cause.  Instead,  through  long  weeks  we  saw  Russia,  having 
been  redeemed  by  revolution,  hesitant,  doubtful  as  to  whether  she 
should  retake  her  place  in  the  battle  line,  while  goings  and  com- 
ings between  Russians  and  Germans,  fraternizing  between  Russian 
and  German  soldiers  at  the  front,  all  suggested  that  a  separate 
peace  was  at  hand. 

As  the  present  year  ends  we  see  the  turn  of  the  tide.  The 
United  States  has  entered  the  war,  bringing  vast  resources  of  men 
and  money.  Russia  has  returned,  at  least  temporarily,  to  the 
firing  line.  In  Germany  a  political  unrest  is  now  claiming  atten- 
tion, and  for  the  first  time  there  is  a  possibility  that  what  has  hap- 
pened in  Russia  may,  in  some  measure,  happen  in  Germany,  and 
that  those  who  made  the  war  and  would  carry  it  on  may  be  sepa- 
rated from  the  people,  who,  while  they  consented  to  the  war, 
have  grown  weary  of  its  sacrifices. 

Of  the  year  191 6-' 17  one  may  perhaps  say  accurately  that 
the  beginning  and  the  end  were  the  most  hopeful  moments  for  the 
Allied  cause.  Between  these  two  points  lie  some  of  the  bitterest 
disappointments  in  military  history. 

Forty-eight 


BY    FRANK    H.     S  I  M  O  N  D  S 


First  among  the  operations  of  importance  in  the  latter  half  of 
last  year  was  the  Battle  of  the  Somme.  It  had  proceeded  with 
fury  all  through  July.  When  the  third  year  of  the  war  opened 
it  remained  still  a  baffling  puzzle  to  all  who  observed  it  at  a  dis- 
tance. With  relatively  little  change  in  ground,  the  British  and  the 
French  armies  fought  it  out  for  moral  supremacy.  The  new  British 
army,  green,  not  yet  trained  in  modem  warfare  or  modern  weapons, 
passed  through  the  furnace  from  July  to  November,  from  the 
bloody  repulse  of  Gommecourt  to  the  triumphant  success  of  Beau- 
mont Hamel. 

When  the  Battle  of  the  Somme  was  over  the  British  army  felt 
itself  more  than  the  master  of  the  German  army.  With  the  French 
it  had  taken  85,000  prisoners  north  and  south  of  the  Somme,  and 
the  British  share  was  the  larger.  It  had  pushed  the  Germans  back 
in  places  six  or  seven  miles,  and  in  the  following  spring  the  German 
retreat  was  to  demonstrate  that  the  Battle  of  the  Somme  had  im- 
perilled German  security  from  Arras  to  Soissons.  Had  the  weather 
been  more  favorable  probably  the  retreat  would  have  come  last  fall, 
but  when  it  did  come  it  demonstrated  the  superiority  of  the  new 
British  army  over  what  was  left  of  the  old  German  army — a 
superiority  unmistakable,  but  yet  far  from  sufficient  to  insure  a 
speedy  decision. 

While  the  Battle  of  the  Somme  was  at  its  height,  Italy  struck 
out  toward  Gorizia  in  August,  pushed  forward  across  the  Isonzo 
River,  climbed  up  onto  the  Carso  Plateau,  took  thousands  of 
Austrian  prisoners,  captured  the  city  of  Gorizia  and  won  the  first 
great  military  battle  in  the  history  of  united  Italy.  Yet  there  was 
no  morrow  to  this  success.  On  their  rearward  lines  the  Austrians 
checked  the  Italians.  Trench  warfare  was  resumed.  Trieste  was 
not  captured,  nor  has  it  fallen  yet,  although  the  spring  has  seen  a 
new  Italian  offensive. 

Page  Forty-nine 


THIRD  YEAR  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

While  the  Italian  attack  was  being  carried  forward  there 
broke  out  in  Bukowina  and  Southern  Galicia  a  new  Brusiloff  stroke. 
Pushing  forward  south  of  the  Dniester  from  Czernowitz  to  Stan- 
islau— over  eighty-five  miles — the  Russians  now  threatened  Lem- 
berg  from  the  south  as  they  had  threatened  it  from  Lutsk  and 
Brody  on  the  north  in  June.  In  ten  days  they  captured  more  than 
80.000  prisoners,  bringing  their  total  captures  for  their  Eastern 
offensive  from  June  1  to  400,000.  Never  in  the  course  of  the 
whole  war  had  the  Allied  outlook  seemed  so  propitious  as  it  did  in 
August  and  September.  1916.  And  in  this  time  came  the  sudden 
and  dramatic  entrance  of  Rumania  into  the  battle  line.  What 
everybody  had  long  expected  when  it  came  surprised  the  world. 
Suddenly  Rumania  declared  war  and  sent  her  armies  across  the 
Transylvanian  Alps  into  Hungarian  territory.  For  several  weeks 
there  followed  brilliant  advances  by  the  Rumanians.  Cities  and 
towns  fell;  more  than  a  third  of  Transylvania — all  that  section 
which  lies  between  the  outspread  arms  of  Moldavia  and  Wallachia 
— fell  to  the  new  belligerent 

But  then  came  the  heavy  change.  Suddenly  a  great  Turco- 
Bulgar-German  army  from  the  south  of  the  Danube  commanded 
by  the  redoubtable  Mackensen,  who  had  won  the  Dunajec  the  year 
before,  began  to  push  forward  into  the  Dobrodja,  driving  before  it 
the  weak  Rumanian  guards,  until  it  passed  the  railroad  line  going 
from  Constanza  to  Bucharest,  and  occupied  the  province  of 
Dobrudja,  which  had  long  been  the  chief  of  Bulgarian  ambition. 

Worse  was  now  to  follow.  Under  Falkenhayn,  who  had 
been  succeeded  by  Hindenburg  as  chief  of  staff,  a  great  German 
army  pushed  southward,  defeated  the  Rumanian  army  in  Transyl- 
vania heavily,  and  then  suddenly,  almost  without  warning,  burst 
into  the  plains  of  Rumania  through  the  Transylvania  passes.  Al- 
most before  the  world  had  realized  what  had  happened,  armies 

P»te  Fifty 


BY    FRANK    H.     S  I  M  O  N  D  S 


from  the  south  and  the  north  were  encircling  Bucharest  and  routed 
Rumanian  armies  were  fleeing  eastward  toward  Russia,  while 
Ferdinand,  himself  a  Hohenzollern,  had  taken  the  road  to  exile 
followed  by  so  many  kings  in  this  struggle. 

There  never  was  any  more  swift,  sure,  decisive  victory  in 
military  history  than  that  of  the  Germans  over  Rumania.  It  came 
at  a  point  when  German  prospects  seemed  desperate.  It  was  won 
by  heavy  artillery  against  small  guns.  It  was  won  by  veteran 
troops  against  ill-trained  recruits.  It  was  won  by  a  great  nation 
which  had  been  three  years  at  war  against  a  small  nation  which 
had  had  no  war  training.  But  nothing  could  rob  it  of  its  moral 
effect.  All  over  the  world  the  fall  of  Bucharest  was  taken  as  an 
authentic  sign,  if  not  of  German  victory,  at  least  of  the  fact  that 
Germany  could  not  be  conquered. 

This  Balkan  episode  was  terminated  by  a  minor  effort  on  the 
part  of  Sarrail's  army  from  Salonica,  which  did,  in  fact,  reach  and 
pass  Monastir,  but  there  it  stood  and  still  stands.  All  hope  and 
possibility  that  the  Balkans  had  held  out  for  the  Allies  in  1914 
and  1915,  and  finally  in  1916,  when  Rumania  came  in,  had  now 
vanished.  Rumania  and  Serbia,  which  had  allied  themselves  with 
the  enemies  of  Germany,  were  in  ruins,  Serbia  totally  in  the  hands 
of  the  enemy,  Rumania  for  the  greater  part,  and  little  Montenegro 
shared  the  Serbian  ruin.  Bulgaria  had  decided  for  the  Central 
Powers,  and  her  armies  now  occupied  provinces  torn  from  her  at 
Bucharest,  and,  in  addition,  lands  long  coveted.  In  Greece  all 
that  the  King  could  do  was  done  for  Germany.  A  Greek  gar- 
rison surrendered  Greek  cities  and  Greek  provinces  to  the  Bulgar, 
and  King  Constantine  contemplated  a  blow  in  the  rear  against 
Sarrail's  army  at  Monastir. 

It  was  at  this  time  that  Germany,  choosing  her  moment  with 
supreme  skill,  proposed  that  there  should  be  peace,  opening  the  way 

Page  Fifty-one 


THIRD     YEAR    OF    THE    GREAT    WAR 

to  an  end  of  the  conflict  which  should  not  be  unprofitable  to  her. 
But  this  German  offer  was  rejected.  The  Allies  returned  to  the 
war,  having  clearly  foreshadowed  a  determination  to  fight  on  until 
the  Mitteleuropa  that  Germany  had  created  from  Berlin  to  Bag- 
dad and  from  the  Meuse  to  the  Dwina  was  destroyed. 

Failing  thus  to  achieve  her  end  by  negotiation,  Germany  had 
recourse  to  her  last  remaining  weapon,  the  submarine.  She  was 
now  outnumbered  in  Europe  on  every  front.  She  was  outgunned  in 
the  West  Her  material  resources  were  shrinking  at  home.  Her 
future  economic  prosperity  was  being  doomed  as  one  nation  after 
another  entered  the  coalition  against  her  and  became  participants 
equally  in  arrangements  that  would  last  after  the  war.  On  Feb- 
ruary 1  Germany  announced  that  she  purposed  to  sink  all  ships, 
with  exceptions  that  were  only  illusory  and,  for  the  United  States, 
humiliating.  The  German  decision  meant  one  thing.  It  meant 
that  the  Germans  believed  that  only  by  one  method  could  they  win 
the  war.  They  could  no  longer  win  it  by  military  decisions,  al- 
though they  might  be  able  to  hold  their  lines  for  long  months,  per- 
haps for  years.  It  meant  that,  the  power  of  the  offensive  on  land 
having  passed  away  from  them,  they  would  have  recourse  to  an 
offensive  on  the  seas. 

Hardly  had  the  German  decision  been  made  when  Russia 
was  temporarily  eliminated  from  the  war  by  an  internal  revolution 
which  shook  to  the  very  bottom  all  her  social  and  military  organiza- 
tions, and  the  entrance  of  the  United  States  into  the  war  on  April 
6  could  not  seem  to  the  Germans  to  be  a  counterpoise  for  the  re- 
tirement of  Russia. 

In  April  of  this  year  Germany  could  again  expect,  if  not  the 
triumph  looked  for  at  the  beginning  of  the  war,  if  not  the  decision 
expected  at  Verdun,  still  a  substantial  victory  following  a  separate 
peace  with  Russia  and  preceding  the  time  when  the  United  States 

Pact  Fifty-  t«w 


BY    FRANK    H.    S  I  M  O  N  D  S 

could  arrive  with  new  arms  on  the  field  of  battle.  And  there  was 
throughout  Germany  a  profound  optimism,  in  the  midst  of  misery, 
based  upon  the  hope  held  out  by  the  submarine  programme  and  by 
the  prospect  of  a  separate  peace  with  Russia. 

What  has  happened  since  we  all  know.  As  the  campaigning 
season  approached  and  the  German  army  was  forced  to  retire  from 
Arras  to  Soissons,  giving  over  the  ground  threatened  by  the  British 
and  the  French  offensive  at  the  Somme — threatened  primarily  by 
the  expansion  of  the  British  lines  and  by  the  never  ending  intensity 
of  British  artillery  pounding — we  saw  at  last  an  actual  and  con- 
siderable change  on  the  Western  front.  Nearly  a  thousand 
square  miles  of  French  territory  were  evacuated,  and  there  was  a 
forward  move  of  the  Allies  unequalled  since  the  Mame. 

Yet  the  limits  of  this  gain  were  clearly  indicated.  By  leaving 
a  district  from  ten  to  fifteen  miles  deep  the  Germans  had  postponed 
any  possible  attack  on  this  front  for  many  months.  They  had 
turned  the  country  into  a  desert.  They  had  destroyed  every  means 
of  communication,  every  village.  They  had  hacked  down  fruit 
trees  and  destroyed  the  magnificent  old  trees  along  the  roads.  The 
consequence  of  this  was  that  from  the  Aisne  to  the  Cojeul,  from 
Soissons  almost  to  Arras,  there  had  been  created  before  the  new 
German  line  a  moat  of  desolation,  which  had  first  to  be  passed  by 
the  builders  of  British  railroads  before  the  army  could  arrive. 
Now,  after  four  months,  there  has  still  been  no  attack  on  this  front, 
save  only  around  Arras. 

Yet  this  Arras  offensive,  which  flamed  forth  on  April  9, 
demonstrated  a  new  superiority  of  British  arms  and  British  weapons 
still  unsuspected.  A  gain  of  five  miles  at  the  maximum  on  a  front 
of  fifteen,  22,000  prisoners  and  more  than  200  guns,  many  of  them 
heavy — these  were  the  fruits  of  the  first  British  offensive  of  1917, 

Page  Fifty-thret 


THIRD  YEAR  OF  THE  GREAT  WAR 

compared  with  the  far  more  dearly  purchased  and.  by  comparison, 
meagre  gains  of  the  preceding  year. 

And  in  June  we  had  a  new  and  complete  success,  retaking 
all  the  heights  vital  to  the  defence  of  the  German  lines  as  they 
existed  and  necessary  to  the  Allies  as  the  basis  for  a  new  offensive. 
Seven  thousand  prisoners  and  many  guns  —  a  quick,  smashing 
triumph  accomplished  with  the  accuracy  of  an  engineering  experi- 
ment. This  was  the  third  Battle  of  Ypres  and  this  was  the  final 
demonstration  of  British  superiority  over  the  Germans  —  a  supe- 
riority no  longer  questioned,  but  not  yet  sufficient  to  overcome  the 
advantages  of  the  defensive  in  the  endless  lines  of  trenches  and  the 
enormous  amount  of  machine  guns  which  the  Germans  had  prepared. 

Turning  to  the  battle  between  the  French  and  the  Germans, 
the  picture  is  not  the  same.  When  the  present  war  year  opened 
the  French  before  Verdun  were  standing  almost  in  their  last  ditch. 
Vaux  had  fallen  in  June,  and  the  Germans  had  reached  the  ditch 
of  Souville.  A  little  further  gain,  and  it  seemed  as  if,  after  all, 
Verdun  would  terminate  in  a  German  victory. 

The  Allied  offensive  at  the  Somme  in  July  prevented  this, 
but  it  was  not  until  August  that  German  pressure  at  Verdun  began 
to  fall  off,  and  in  October  and  November  two  French  offensives 
retook  Douaumont  and  Vaux,  cleared  the  circle  of  hills  and  re- 
gained the  vital  ground  lost  in  February  and  March  of  1916. 
December  saw  the  finish  of  the  Verdun  episode.  A  great  victory 
had  been  won. 

In  the  two  offensives  about  Verdun  of  October  and  November 
the  French  took  18,000  prisoners  and  many  guns,  and  the  victory 
brought  the  victor.  General  Vivelle,  to  the  attention  of  the  world. 
JofTre  was  visibly  weary,  and  in  due  course  of  time  he  took  the 
role  of  Marshal  of  France,  and  Nivelle  succeeded  him  as  com- 
mander in  chief.  Vivelle's  success  at  Verdun  raised  hopes  that 


P*ft 


BY    FRANK    H.    S  I  M  O  N  D  S 


he  would  be  able  to  expand  this  success  on  a  wider  front.  France, 
so  long  weary,  looked  forward  to  the  campaign  of  1917  with  much 
expectation. 

This  expectation  was  not  realized.  The  French  offensive, 
beginning  on  the  1 6th  of  April,  was  one  of  the  most  cruel  dis- 
appointments of  all  to  the  French  people.  Important  ground  was 
brilliantly  taken.  Nearly  30,000  prisoners,  more  than  1 00  guns 
of  one  sort  or  another,  were  captured.  But  the  casualties  were 
terrific,  and  the  impossibility  of  a  sweeping  advance  was  soon 
recognized.  Nivelle  and  Magin  had  expected  to  enter  Laon,  but 
nine  miles  from  Laon  their  advance  was  checked.  They  had  plan- 
ned to  take  Brimont,  but  Brimont  still  holds  out.  They  had 
planned  to  disblock  Rheims,  but  thousands  of  shells  are  falling  each 
week  into  the  martyred  city. 

The  result  was  another  staff  change.  Petain  came  back  to 
command  the  French  army.  The  French  army  passed  from  the 
offensive  to  the  defensive,  and  the  French  people  sat  down  grimly 
to  endure  another  disappointment  and  another  winter  of  war.  By 
the  first  of  July  the  French  dead  numbered  a  million ;  the  dead  and 
those  permanently  eliminated  from  the  firing  line  passed  two  mil- 
lions, and  one  could  say  that  upward  of  a  third  of  the  man  power 
of  France  had  been  used  up. 

After  the  revolution  Russia  long  lingered  in  the  throes  of 
social  agitation  and  domestic  disorder.  It  was  not  until  July  that 
there  was  a  sudden  righting,  and  a  Russian  offensive,  first  north 
and  then  south  of  the  Dniester,  revived  a  part — but  only  a  part — 
of  the  glory  of  1916.  The  Allies  who  had  expected  nothing, 
rejoiced  at  a  Russian  victory,  but  even  as  it  perceived  the  greatness 
and  the  moral  value  of  the  Russian  offensive,  the  entire  opinion  of 
the  world  recognized  the  difficulties  in  front  of  another  sustained 
effort.  After  taking  nearly  40,000  prisoners  and  a  vast  store  of 

Page  Fifty-five 


THIRD     YEAR    OF    THE    GREAT    WAR 

material — after  reaching  and  passing  the  Austrian  headquarters  at 
Kalusz — the  Russian  advance  was  stopped  at  the  Lomnica  River 
in  the  third  week  of  July,  where  it  remains  when  these  lines  are 
written. 

We  have  here,  then,  the  measure  of  the  year  of  war.  First 
of  all,  a  grand  concentric  attack  upon  the  Central  Powers,  begun 
by  the  Russians  in  Volhynia  and  Galicia,  taken  up  by  the  British 
and  French  at  the  Somme,  carried  on  by  Italy  at  Gorizia,  and 
brought  to  a  final  climax  by  new  Russian  efforts  in  Galicia  and 
the  Rumanian  invasion  of  Transylvania.  Then  following  the  shin- 
ing triumph  of  the  Germans  in  Rumania.  Not  only  had  they 
escaped  deadly  peril  on  all  fronts,  but  in  the  moment  of  their 
greatest  danger  the  Germans  had  levelled  a  fatal  stroke  against  a 
new  foe. 

The  Allied  offensive  of  1917  was  changed  in  its  character,  if 
not  prevented,  by  Russia's  collapse.  We  have  not  yet  seen  and  we 
may  not  see  such  a  general  attack  as  came  last  year.  We  may  see 
a  perpetuation  of  the  calm  until  the  new  campaign  of  1918,  when 
newly  organized  American  armies  and  reorganized  Russian  troops 
may  be  available.  Or  we  may  see  one  or  more  British  offensives 
like  Arras  and  the  third  Ypres.  But  despite  Russia's  return  to  the 
charge,  it  seems  to  me  unlikely  that  there  will  be  repeated  the  ef- 
forts of  last  summer  to  beat  upon  every  front  at  the  same  time.  It 
must  be  recognized  that  were  peace  to  come  to-day  on  the  map  of 
Europe  the  German  victory  would  be  unmistakable.  Provinces, 
principalities,  cities,  swept  into  the  German  lap  in  the  campaign 
of  1914  and  1915,  remain  there  still.  Even  the  British  offensive 
which  rewon  Bagdad  and  wiped  out  the  mess  of  Kut-el-Amara  has 
only  touched  the  fringe  of  Germany's  Mitteleuropa.  Another 
British  army,  at  the  door  of  the  Holy  Land,  is  still  but  a  remote 
threat.  From  Antwerp  and  Brussels  to  Warsaw  and  Vilna ;  from 

Pave  Fifty-ti* 


BY    PRANK    H.     S  I  M  O  N  D  S 


Hamburg  and  Bremen  to  the  marshes  of  Jerusalem  and  to  the 
upper  reaches  of  the  Euphrates,  the  German  will  prevails. 

The  campaign  of  1916  was  an  effort  to  break  down  the  walls 
of  the  great  Central  European  empire  which  Germany  and  her  allies 
had  constructed.  As  such  it  was  a  failure.  As  such  the  cam- 
paigns since  have  been  failures.  The  edifice  still  stands,  and  if  the 
submarine  threat,  which  was  to  bring  Britain  to  her  knees  in  three 
months,  had  failed  too,  one  must  at  least  confess  that  the  hope  of 
starving  Germany  has  again  been  postponed  another  year,  and 
whatever  the  extent  of  the  new  harvest,  Germany  has  at  least  lasted 
to  it. 

There  remains  the  question  whether  the  Germans  will  now 
content  themselves  to  evacuate  the  conquered  lines — to  return  to  the 
conditions  of  191 4 — or  whether  they  will  insist  upon  preserving 
their  Middle  Europe.  With  a  Germany  in  possession  of  what 
Germany  now  holds  the  Allies  cannot  make  peace.  Any  peace 
would  be  but  a  preparation  for  a  world  domination  by  Germany. 
The  military  problem  of  the  campaign  of  1 9 1  7-'  1 8  is  unmistak- 
able. It  must  be  to  break  in  the  dikes  erected  about  this  Central 
European  empire.  Failing  this,  it  must  be  to  apply  steadily  and 
unceasingly  such  pressure  on  the  outside  that  the  demands  for  peace 
within  shall  rise  until  they  can  no  longer  be  silenced.  That  Ger- 
many is  war  weary  no  one  can  doubt.  That  Germany  is  so  war 
weary  that  she  is  prepared  now  to  surrender  her  conquered  lands 
and  that  she  is  also  prepared  to  surrender  Alsace-Lorraine,  in- 
demnify Belgium,  give  over  German  Poland  seems  to  me  unlikely 
in  the  extreme. 

Actually,  the  German  General  Staff  set  forth  for  itself  in 
July  and  August,  1916,  the  task  of  holding  through,  and  one  is 
obliged  to  recognize  that,  however  terrible  the  strain,  on  August  1 , 
1917,  the  German  is  still  holding  through.  Nor  can  one  mistake 

Page  Fifty-seven 


THIRD  YEAR  OP  THE  GREAT  WAR 

the  gravity  of  the  new  submarine  war.  Germany  has  been  wrong 
in  believing  that  after  three  months  of  unrestricted  submarine  war- 
fare England  would  be  brought  to  her  knees,  but  there  are  few 
naval  experts  who  believe  that  if  the  submarine  ravages  continue 
unrestricted.  England  can  fight  much  after  October.  1918,  or  fail 
to  make  peace  by  negotiation  within  a  brief  period  after  that  date. 

For  myself.  I  am  satisfied  that  we  are  entering  into  the  last 
year  of  the  war.  We  may  have  a  military  decision  between  now 
and  the  end  of  the  campaigning  season  of  next  year.  If  we  do  not, 
I  do  not  believe  the  war  will  be  ended  by  a  military  decision.  We 
shall  not  have  a  military  decision  if  Russia  quits  the  battle  line  and 
the  United  States  fails  to  make  a  prompt  and  great  effort,  supply- 
ing in  some  part  the  Russian  defection. 

I  believe  a  military  victory  must  now  come  to  the  Allies,  if 
Russia  and  the  United  States  do  their  part.  I  believe  it  may  come 
to  the  Allies  if  the  United  States  measures  up  to  her  great  task  and 
her  obvious  duty.  But  I  do  not  believe  that  the  element  of  time 
is  any  longer  an  ally  of  the  enemies  of  the  Central  Powers.  I  be- 
lieve that  unless  the  submarine  menace  is  ended  the  Allies  cannot 
go  longer  than  the  end  of  next  year.  And  I  do  not  believe  that  with- 
out great  American  reinforcements  a  military  decision  will  be  had. 

The  German  army  is  no  longer  the  army  of  1914.  German 
resources  are  fading  and  falling.  Yet  during  the  war  of  the 
Spanish  Succession  Louis  XIV  faced  the  great  coalition  under 
equal  disadvantages  and  managed  to  avoid  the  partition  of  his 
country  and  to  achieve  a  peace  without  indemnity  or  annexation. 
If  the  Germans  can  last  until  the  snow  flies  next  autumn  they  may 
be  able  to  do  the  same  thing.  Whether  they  will  be  able  to  do 
this  or  not  depends  very  largely  upon  the  United  States  and  Russia, 
and  only  a  blind  and  foolish  man,  whatever  his  hopes,  would  place 
great  reliance  upon  Russia. 

Peg*  Fifty-right 


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